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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Interdiction operations at sea

Degree:

Master of Science

The dissertation is a study of interdiction operations against irregular maritime
migrants at sea. Interdiction operations beyond the territorial seas can be contentious
since different legal frameworks are applicable depending on the three maritime
areas: contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and high seas. However, existing
conventions and national laws do not necessarily cover the whole migrant situation
as most of them were established a long time ago.
There are many publications regarding irregular maritime migrants in the past.
However, interdiction methods always change depending on migration trends,
government policies and case laws. Accordingly, legal analysis needs to be updated
all the time.
Both Italy and Australia have a long history of dealing with irregular maritime
migrants. Because the two countries are located in different regions, the ways that
the states approach are somewhat different. In order to have a holistic view, it is
significant to compare how the two states tackle migrant issues with the case laws,
the government regimes and the regional frameworks.
With regard to irregular migrants, it is essential to discuss three key points:
jurisdiction, non-refoulement and rescue operations. The discussion chapter
examines the above three issues, whilst conclusions and further research are written
in the final chapter.
KEYWORDS: Interdiction operation, irregular maritime migrants, jurisdiction, nonrefoulement, rescue operation
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1

Background

An interdiction operation against irregular maritime migrants is a complex issue in
the maritime field as there are different maritime zones and different applicable laws
at sea. The Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Indo-Pacific region are
some of the biggest hotspots for migrants around the world. In this regard, there are
already a lot of articles and reports have been established but mostly the ways of
approaching are from the humanitarian side. Whilst protecting human rights is
essential, there might be other factors needed to consider. For example, a remarkable
incident occurred off the coast of Libya, which was in the high seas in November
2017. A dinghy departed the Tripoli area on November 5th that soon capsized after
departure. There were almost 150 people onboard and the search and rescue (SAR)
coordination was dealt by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) in
Rome as they received the distress call first (S.S and others v. Italy, 2019).
However, the Italian Coast Guard (ICG) did not rescue the migrants in distress and
instead let the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) rescue migrants at sea. The plaintiff
argued from the humanitarian side that this is an unacceptable situation because Italy
knew that the migrants were taken back to Libya and it could possibly violate
humanitarian laws (Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 2012). From the law
enforcement side, in contrast, there was a possibility that migrants might have sent a
distress call in order to enter Italy even though the boat was probably still seaworthy
at that time. Therefore, it should be well balanced from both the humanitarian and
the law enforcement perspectives in light of legal instruments and case laws in each
maritime zone.

1.2

Aims and objectives

The aims and objectives of this study are to critically analyze what kinds of methods
maritime authorities apply in order to interdict irregular maritime migrants at sea
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since it is discussed that authorities might potentially violate international
conventions and legislations. Interdiction is generally defined as stopping,
inspecting, searching and seizing vessels for the purpose of prohibiting actions
(Kenneth et al, 2016). This study will also discuss how interdiction methods have
changed over the course of time. Case laws could influence the trend of interdiction
methods because authorities occasionally take new methods after the court’s
decision. Therefore, this research intends to fill the gap between previous interdiction
operations and emerging cases outside of the territorial seas. An expected outcome of
this research is to create a holistic view of irregular maritime migrant issues and
understand maritime authorities’ interdiction methods in different major migration
areas. As for the research areas at sea, this study will look at the Mediterranean Seas
and the Indo-Pacific regions in order to examine the regional issues at first.
Thereafter it will narrow down to Italy and Australia to specifically focus on the
migration policy in the two states.
Looking at Italy, it is one of the biggest destinations for migrants in Europe together
with Spain and Greece according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) report (UNHCR, 2021). The report also notes that the departure
countries for migrants are not focused on one place. Especially in the Mediterranean
Seas, although Tunisia is the biggest departure country for migrants in 2020, Algeria
and Morocco are major states that migrants depart to go to Europe. For instance,
Morocco has been a transit country for sub-Saharan migrants since after 1990
(Lahlou, 2015). In terms of maritime operations, there were many case laws
established with regard to interdiction operations by the Italian maritime authorities.
Several key judgements were made by the ECtHR and they are worth analyzing with
related legislations in Europe. The Hirsi case particularly had a major impact not
only in Italy but in the entire Europe. A brief summary of this incident is that a group
of about two hundred people left Libya for Italy. Applicants of the Hirsi case, 11
Somali and 13 Eritrean people, were intercepted by the Italian maritime authority in
Italy’s exclusive economic zone. After that, the migrants were transferred to the
Italian military vessel and eventually sent back to Libya. While migrants were being
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sent back, none of them was interviewed properly, and nobody knew where the
military ship was heading (Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 2012). The ECtHR later
concluded that Italy violated several articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Among other things, a remarkable decision was that jurisdiction is
given to Italy in the exclusive economic zone regarding the interdiction operation
against migrants. Accordingly, European maritime authorities needed to alter the
interdiction methods. This study will analyze further in Chapter 5.
As for Australia, the country is one of the biggest migrant destinations, especially
from East Asia and Southeast Asia. A key difference between Italy and Australia is
that there might be multiple jurisdictions involved in Italy’s cases such as Libya and
other nations, whilst Australia normally does not collaborate with other countries in
order to interdict migrants. Looking at the decision from the courts, many cases are
in favor of plaintiffs in Europe whilst most cases are in favor of defendants in
Australia even in comparable ones. Therefore, it is worth considering by comparing
similar cases in the two different regions with regard to interdiction operations.
Additionally, there are relatively new cases taking place in Australia as opposed to
other large maritime migration areas such as the United States. Consequently,
Australian national legislations and regional frameworks are regularly updated along
with new cases. Those are the reasons why the two nations were selected for this
study. A comparative analysis of their experiences will contribute to having a holistic
view on the irregular maritime migrant issue.

1.3

Scope and exclusions

The scope of this research does not exceed an analysis of interdiction methods by
maritime authorities. It spotlights how authorities exercise law enforcement power in
light of relevant conventions, legislations, case laws and other factors. In terms of the
maritime areas, this paper will discuss the areas which are beyond the territorial seas
such as contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and high seas.

3

Since coastal states generally have the right to exercise its law enforcement power in
the territorial seas, migrant issues are relatively clear that states are responsible for
migrants under related conventions in the territorial seas. That said, one thing should
be noted is that the right of “innocent passage” is generally accepted based on the
freedom of navigation to ships of all states under the United Nations Conventions on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Tanaka, 2019). However, this is unlikely to apply to
migrant boats for two reasons. First, the purpose of irregular migrant boats is to reach
a coastal state to enter the state without proper immigration procedures in general.
Second, Article 19 of the UNCLOS says that a passage of a foreign ship against a
coastal state’s immigration laws shall be regarded to be prejudicial. For those
reasons, once migrant boats enter the territorial seas, it is hard to claim that migrants
do not breach any coastal state’s immigration laws and merely pass through as an
innocent passage. In essence, entering the territorial seas by breaching a coastal
state’s laws could be regarded as a “non-innocent” passage.
Moreover, this paper does not extend its analysis to a state which is under war.
Otherwise, the Geneva Convention applies to the case. Furthermore, the correlation
between the UNCLOS, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
(SAR Convention) and the Geneva Convention is uncertain and this would require
another examination.

1.4

Research questions

The research question in this paper is to examine what major issues are in assessing
interdiction operations both in Italy and in Australia and how it changes over the
course of time in light of recent case law. In addition, it is significant to spotlight
whether emerging cases do not fall within the scope of state’s responsibility. For
example, several authors have expressed their views that an indirect approach
conducted by Italy could possibly violate relevant conventions such as the case of S.S
and others (Pijnenburg, 2020; Moreno-Lax, 2020). Having said that, since no case
law has been issued for an indirect approach yet, it is uncertain whether or not Italy
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is responsible in such case. This point will be later analyzed in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 5.
This study will tackle three major questions that are crucial in assessing interdiction
operations. First of all, the condition of establishing criminal jurisdiction outside of
the territorial sea is a fundamental issue in analyzing irregular maritime migrants. In
terms of criminal jurisdiction, although exercising law enforcement power is limited
against foreign vessels by Article 27 of the UNCLOS, it is unlikely to apply to
migrant boats in the territorial seas. Because the purpose of maritime migrants
entering the territorial seas is normally recognized as reaching a coastal state, Article
27 excludes such a case if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state.
Hence, the article only applies to merchant vessels or government vessels operated
for commercial purposes (Markard, 2016). As for migrant boats, they potentially
breach a coastal state’s immigration laws at the point of entering the territorial seas.
Therefore, a coastal state may exercise its jurisdiction to irregular maritime migrant
boats in the territorial seas. On the other hand, exercising jurisdiction is not generally
accepted outside of the territorial seas. In other words, it is limited to exceptional
cases in principle. Additionally, the UNCLOS defines limited purposes in each
maritime zone for interdiction beyond the territorial seas. In this regard, the
jurisdiction matter is even more complex recently since maritime authorities took
new approaches including indirect interdiction without any physical contacts.
Therefore, this is a new challenge for the issue of irregular maritime migrants in
Europe and Australia. Whether authority is given jurisdiction or not is a fundamental
point to see if the authority needs to comply with related conventions and
legislations.
Second, applicability of non-refoulement in Article 33 of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) is another major issue. For instance,
the Refugee Convention does not stipulate any areal limitation to which area the
convention applies. For this reason, there are conflicting views between a broad
interpretation and a narrow interpretation of this convention. A broad interpretation
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does not limit its applicable area, whilst a narrow interpretation restricts the area in
the territorial seas. As for Italy and Australia, both nations have tackled this issue in
the past. For example, Italy once questioned the applicability of non-refoulement in
the high seas given its areal uncertainty (Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 2012).
Australia also claimed that it has a limited scope in the contiguous zones (CPCF v.
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, (2015). Italy also argued in the
Hirsi case that there should be several exceptions for the applicability such as
memorandum of understanding (MoU) or bilateral agreements. The reason that states
are reluctant to accept non-refoulement is that once the principle of non-refoulement
applies, maritime authorities are restricted to take certain actions such as sending
back migrants to a country with a possibility of torture or other inhuman treatments.
Therefore, the applicability of non-refoulement is one of the most significant
protections for irregular maritime migrants.
Third, an interpretation of rescue operations is another crucial issue in assessing
interdiction. As maritime operations at sea are mostly invisible for other people,
authorities could say that they simply conduct a rescue operation by following the
duty of rescue instead of interdiction. The correlation between interdiction and “duty
to render assistance” which is stipulated in Article 98 of the UNCLOS is often
brought up as an arguable point since both actions seem identical by picking up
migrants on board. Moreover, a “place of safety” which is described under the SAR
Convention is another point because states sometimes take migrants to a place that is
not the closest point from the rescue area. For example, the migrants argued in the
CPCF case that the authority tried to take migrants to India even though the rescue
point was originally just sixteen nautical miles from the Australian territory (CPCF
v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 2015). Furthermore, it is
sometimes claimed that bilateral agreements or regional cooperation should be taken
into consideration. All in all, differentiating between rescue operations and
interdiction is a key to assessing maritime activities.
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1.5

Outline of the dissertation

In the first chapter, the three key research questions were raised with the set scope
based on the objectives of the study.
In the second chapter, this research will discuss interdiction operation methods in
Italy with the government’s policy and how it changes over the course of time. The
interdiction methods also vary depending on regional cooperation and agreements
with foreign countries. Case laws are mainly about Italy and Libya as these incidents
critically influenced on Italy’s migration policy. In addition, Australia’s methods
should be spotlighted as well since Italy and Australia take different measures on
similar matters. The result will be summarized at the end of the chapter.
In the third chapter, it is essential to analyze the backgrounds of maritime migration
in Italy and Australia. It is because the trend of interdiction methods has been
historically changing by case laws and regional frameworks. After that, fundamental
legal instruments in three maritime zones will be examined. Each maritime zone has
its own character and legally contentious issues. Finding those points will benefit in
assessing further topics in the following chapter.
In the fourth chapter, this study will tackle three key topics: jurisdiction, nonrefoulement and rescue operations. These topics will be analyzed based on the
outcome of the second and the third chapters. In order to have a holistic view, further
case laws will be brought up here to corroborate this research.
Finally, conclusions and further research will be given in the five chapter. This will
highlight how the outcome would be instructive with current case laws and what
future cases could offer to develop the discussion of interdiction operations.
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Chapter 2 Literature review
In the second chapter, literature reviews on specific topics are conducted contributing
to the following discussions. Since the purpose of this chapter is merely for literature
review, no examination will be made out of the content. The analysis will be
described in the following chapters. Item 2.1 and 2.2 explain the general meaning of
interdiction operations and SAR operations. After that, while Item 2.3 will describe
Italy’s new interdiction methods after the Hirsi decision, Item 2.4 will explain
Australia’s political influence and the court’s decision at the center of the CPCF
case. The outcome of the above analysis will be shown in Item 2.5.

2.1

Interdiction operation

Guilfoyle (2009) introduces the origin of the word “interdiction” from the Oxford
English Dictionary, explaining an “authoritative prohibition”. It possibly came from
an old French legal word entredit. This word firstly appeared on the law enforcement
scene by the United States military in the 1940s or 1950s. Guilfoyle (2009) describes
that “interdiction” can be dissected into a two-step process. First, boarding,
inspecting and searching of a ship can be conducted for a potential illegal action at
sea. Second, exercising further law enforcement such as arresting ships, persons or
seizing cargo where such suspicions are justified by the first procedure. The first step
should be called “boarding” or “searching”, whilst the second step may be called
“seizure”. Since the second process requires much more law enforcement power than
the first one, “seizure” should be separated from the rest of the processes. In
addition, Guilfoyle (2009) claims that there are mainly three actors conducting
interdiction at sea. Interdiction may be enforced by either coastal states, flag states or
third states, depending on the maritime zone and legal instruments. Coastal states
might be able to interdict ships in several maritime zones close to its coast. Flag
states could also conduct interdiction especially in the high seas which is specified in
Article 94 of the UNCLOS. Moreover, third states might be an actor under limited
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conditions of international laws or with permission by flag states or coastal states.
One example that third states may exercise its law enforcement power is Article 110
of the UNCLOS. States are allowed to interdict a vessel if the vessel is engaged in
piracy, the slave trade and so on (Guilfoyle, 2009).
Tsaltas (2010) spotlights the complexity of the matter of interdiction on the high seas
as freedom of navigation and a state’s sovereignty are given to vessels. In this regard,
the author claims that there are three rights in interdicting vessels at sea based on the
UNCLOS and customary laws in the high seas. Firstly, the “right of approach”
should be brought up because a maritime authority sometimes verifies a vessel’s
flag, registry and other symbols or identifications. Secondly, there is the right of
enquiry including boarding and inspecting a vessel and legal documents. This right
could be used by authorities if the suspicion remains after the first phase. Lastly, an
authority might enforce the right of seizure if they find an evidence of illegal
activities conducted in the high seas (Tsaltas et al, 2010). These rights are somewhat
exemplified in actual training scenes. For example, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) coordinates a training called the Visit, Board, Search
and Seizure (VBSS) training in Asia and African countries for the purpose of
capacity buildings of maritime officers (Tsaltas, 2010).
Coppens (2012) takes a different approach from the above two authors. The author
claims that there is no internationally recognized difference between interception and
interdiction. According to the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, both
interception and interdiction are used as synonyms and the Committee uses those
words interchangeably (UNHCR, 2003). In addition, although Tsaltas (2010)
introduced the three rights of interdiction, Coppens (2012) asserts that the right of
approach might be excluded from the principle of interdiction. The reason being that,
maritime authorities often check a ship’s registry or flag as a routine operation in the
high seas. As the action does not restrict any activities of commercial ships, the right
of approach should not be bound by legal instruments. Furthermore, the author also
asserts that the right of approach could fall under the category of interception
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because the principle of interception is wider than interdiction. In this regard, the
European Union (EU) Council stipulates the definition of maritime interception
including “observing a ship’s identity and nationality” (European Council, 2010).
Therefore, even if the right of approach is not included in interdiction, it could fall
under the category of interception (Coppens, 2012).

2.2

SAR operation

Ratcovich (2019) mentions that the SAR Convention is the prime legal instrument of
the international maritime rescue legislation as well as the UNCLOS and the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention). The
SAR convention entered into force in 1985 and both Italy and Australia are the state
parties of the SAR convention. Based on the convention, “rescue” means an
operation to retrieve rescuees in distress, supply initial medical needs, and carry
rescuees to a place of safety. “Distress” means a situation that a vessel or a person is
under imminent danger and requests immediate support. All ships are required to
give support to a vessel in distress. In terms of the role of vessels, the UNCLOS
divides it into two categories: all ships and maritime authorities. Whilst the item 1 of
Article 98 requires all ships to merely render assistance to ships in distress at sea, the
item 2 further requires maritime authorities to establish a SAR operation and
coordinate the operation with neighboring country. (Ratcovich, 2019).
Mallia (2009) points out several potential issues under the current rescue
conventions. First, the author found an incompatibility between the SAR convention
and the situation of irregular maritime migrants. Although the convention
emphasizes the importance of the duty of rescue, the possible scenarios that the
lawmakers had were shipwrecks and small number of sailors when the convention
was drafted. In response to mass migrants found in the Mediterranean Sea and
Australia, rescue conventions are silent and the same international norms are still
applied as before. Another issue is that the duty of disembarkation is not written
enough compared to the duty of rescue in the SAR convention. “A place of safety”
that Ratcovich mentioned above has no particular criteria to which country a vessel
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should carry rescuees. Again, this might have worked traditionally as the master of
ship simply consulted with rescuees to which destination the rescuees would like to
disembark. However, in the wake of mass migrants, some states have changed its
border guard policy. For example, a Spanish vessel called Francesco Catalina
rescued migrants in Libya’s SAR zone in 2006. The vessel proceeded to Malta to
disembark the migrants but the Maltese authority refused to accept the migrants by
reasoning that there was a lack of imminent danger. Technically, Malta is not obliged
to accept the migrants under the current rescue conventions. Conversely, from the
humanitarian view, the Maltese authority should have rescued. To do so, the
definition of "a place of safety” and “the duty of rescue” shall be modified to tailor to
modern scenarios for protecting migrants. Finally, there is a possibility that maritime
migrants send a false distress call or “self-induced” distress at sea. Under the current
rescue conventions, a ship is bound to rescue if they receive a distress signal from
another vessel. This could be taken advantage of by migrants aiming to reach their
destination. Even though the master of ship may determine the most favorable
disembarkation point after rescuing migrants, the master often meets some resistance
or violent attitude by rescuees to alter the destination once they embark a vessel
(Mallia, 2009).
Ghezelbash (2018) points out the ambiguous line between interdiction and SAR
operations. For instance, the Australian maritime authority often conducts SAR
operations under their border control missions. One possible reason is that while the
state is bound to follow some duties including human rights laws with interdiction
operations, Australia could potentially avoid those obligations by declaring as SAR
operations. This method was also taken by the Italian authority in the Hirsi case.
Though this claim was denied by the ECtHR in 2012, the Australian authority
continues this approach by keeping all information secret. Hence, it is hard to assess
whether the authority is conducting interdiction or SAR operation with little
information. The author mentions that the line between the two operations might be
intentionally distorted by the Australian authorities, especially after Operation
Sovereign Borders was launched in 2013, and this conflation method goes even
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further. The purpose of the operation is to prevent irregular maritime migrants from
entering the Australian territorial seas while the authorities remain silent about any
details of activities. Furthermore, it is important to note that the authority could
potentially change from an interdiction operation to a SAR operation during a
mission and vice versa. Hence, the ambiguity of the two operations could be
exploited by maritime authorities (Ghezelbash et al, 2018).

2.3

Interdiction and the state’s maritime policy in Italy

Pijnenburg (2020) spotlights the MoU updated between Italy and Libya in 2017. This
agreement was initially aimed to strengthen the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation (TFPC) between the two nations in 2008. After the Hirsi case, de jure
and de facto control of interdiction operations were denied by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) which became a trigger for Italy to change the interdiction
methods. Based on the updated MoU agreement, Italy guarantees financial, technical
and asset support to Libya in order to curb the flow of illegal migrations. Instead of
conducting a direct approach to migrants, Italy chose an indirect approach by
supporting the LCG. In fact, the MoU in 2017 called “aid of assistance agreement”
has a huge influence on the migrant issue in the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently,
the number of migrants reaching Italy decreased and a lot of them were sent back to
Libya. When it comes to this indirect approach, the author points out that criminal
jurisdiction over migrants should not be excluded from the indirect interdiction
method by the reason of lacking physical presence. Her work also mentions the
possibility that this support might be a trigger that jurisdiction is given to Italy.
Indeed, it is argued that if state A directs or suggests state B to push back migrants, it
could suffice to establish jurisdiction to the both states with certain conditions. For
example, if there is an obvious link of financial assistance, technical support or a
breach of international obligation between two countries, both states might be to
blame. Even if an interdiction operation is conducted in the high seas and the Italian
authority is not there, the ECtHR once mentioned that “states might be found to have
jurisdiction where they exercise public powers abroad” (Al-Skeini and others v. The
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United Kingdom, 2011). In addition, the case of Women on Waves corroborates the
theory that physical contact and interception are not necessary to establish
jurisdiction (Women on waves and others v. Portugal, 2009). Therefore, even if Italy
is not present and merely providing financial and technical support to Libya, there is
a possibility that Italy is responsible for the Libya’s interdiction operation because of
“extraterritorial” jurisdiction (Pijnenburg, 2020).
Kim (2017) took a different approach on this matter because the author claims that
jurisdiction should be established by a factual control at least over a person or a
territory. In other words, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be limited to only
exceptional cases. If this theory applies to the indirect approach that Pijnenburg
(2020) mentioned, Italy might not be responsible for Libya’s interdiction due to a
lack of factual control. Operations are clearly conducted by the LCG itself.
Moreover, the author mentions that even though the Hirsi case has a strong influence
on Italy’s interdiction method, there is still room for discussion with different
legislations. For instance, it might be possible to find a solution by looking at a
public international law such as the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts in 2001 (ARSIWA). The author found three possible situations where
this legislation might be applied to the aid of the Italian authorities. First, Article 16
of the ARSIWA says that if state A knows the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act by state B with the support of A, state A is responsible for the act such
as a violation of non-refoulement. Although this may be true, it could be difficult to
apply to the Italian case because it is not a settled part of the law. It means that even
the definition of “aid or assistance” is still unclear. Second, applying Article 47 of
ARSIWA is another possibility. It stipulates that if several states are both responsible
for the same internationally wrongful act, both are to blame. In this case, a key point
is to find a correlation between the two countries on the same action, which is
sending migrants back to Libya. However, it needs to be remembered that European
countries, especially Italy, do not have authorities to conduct interdict operations out
of their territories in general. Since Italy simply provides assistance to Libya, it is
hard to find a violation in Italy. Furthermore, even if Article 47 can be applied, it
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requires an aggression with a particular intention by a supporting country. From this
aspect, it could say that Italy has a specific motivation to provide assets and finance.
However, it might be difficult to prove it since such an intention is hard to be proven.
Finally, it might also be possible to rely on “positive due diligence obligations”
because it is recognized by several fields of international laws. With this principle, it
is emphasized that the “positive due diligence” obligation is usually found within a
country’s territory. However, once jurisdiction is established outside of the territorial
seas like Hirsi case, it might give rise to an obligation and it could claim the state’s
responsibility as a result. In other words, establishing jurisdiction by Italy’s
assistance is a key point. Hence, the author tackles this indirect approach with the
jurisdiction matter. In addition, the ARSIWA is brought up as another possibility to
apply as an international law (Kim, 2017).
Moreno-Lax’s work (2020) goes further the topic of aid of assistance. Her work
refers to the recent case called S.S and others in the Mediterranean Sea as explained
in Chapter 1.2 (S.S and others v. Italy, 2019). In this case, it should be highlighted
that the MRCC instructed both the LCG and the non-governmental organization
(NGO) vessel to rescue a migrant boat although the Italian Navy helicopter and
vessel were nearby as a part of the operation. Another fact is that the Libyan vessel
was donated by the Italian government a few months before this incident.
Additionally, several LCG crews were trained in Europe in order to strengthen
border control capability. Allegedly, 47 people were pulled back to Libya and later
they were detained under inhuman circumstances. Her work goes deeper compared
to the previous two authors since Italy did not simply provide assets in the case of
S.S and others. The Italy-funded LCG vessel conducted inhuman treatment and the
Italian authority was merely an onlooker in the distress area. With these factors, the
author claims that jurisdiction should be given to Italy under the ECHR Article 1 in
line with the Hirsi case. The main difference between S.S and others and Hirsi is
whether or not a physical contact exists. For this matter, even though the Italian
authority did not enforce any physical power to migrants in the event of S.S and
others, it could fall within the same policy as the Hirsi case by the “principle of
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proxy”. In other words, the Italian authority remotely exercised its power with the
Italy-funded vessel instead of physically being there. Hence, the author goes onto the
claim that it might reach an adequate amount of “effective control” over migrants on
the boat. Looking at the case laws, most cases including Medvedev required “de fact”
control with a “full and exclusive” manner in order to establish a state’s jurisdiction
(Medvedyev and others v. France, 2010). The author further expects that this case
might be a turning point contributing to a human rights breach because there might
be no severance between the authority’s indirect approach and de facto control with a
full and extensive manner. This case is still ongoing as of August 2021 since it was
lodged in 2019. However, the case S.S and others is expected to determine whether
or not a state, especially Italy, continues to have indirect interdiction operations in
the future (Moreno-Lax, 2020).
Papastavridis’s work (2020) basically follows the previous author’s work but it also
considers the factor of SAR operations as a possible exception from establishment of
jurisdiction. Firstly, Papastavridis (2020) recognizes that a fundamental question
would be whether or not jurisdiction is given to a state with contactless control of
migrants at sea. It is also emphasized that the ECHR Article 1 basically covers
states’ territorial seas but it could be extended under limited conditions. It refers to
the Al-Skeini case which the ECtHR showed the validity of a personal case over a
spatial case (Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, 2011). A key point of this
case was whether the court prioritizes control over the persons or the location of the
incident. In the same principle, the author mentions that the above personal case
might apply to an indirect approach at sea. The reasoning behind it is that the court
clarified in the Al-Skeini case that when the state exercises its power to control
individuals, the state is obliged to follow the ECHR Article 1, even if it is in an
extraterritorial area. Secondly, looking at SAR operations, an important question is
whether or not a rescue operation is recognized as an exception of jurisdiction under
related conventions. More clearly, it is questionable in the S.S and other case if Italy
claims that they are simply involved in rescue operations and it has nothing to do
with interdiction. The author says that the coastal state needs to take action with due
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diligence as well as establishing search and rescue missions. In this regard, there
could be two conditions brought up in order to fulfill the requirement of jurisdiction
during SAR operations. First, a clear recognition of a rescue operation is required
even over technology such as unmanned vehicles, radar and satellite systems.
Second, the existence of a coordinator is also essential like coast guard vessels or
even a rescue coordination center. To apply this hypothesis, jurisdiction might be
given to Italy in the S.S and others case since the coordinator was the Italian MRCC
having de facto control over individual migrants as an on-scene coordinator. In
addition, the MRCC was fully aware of the case as they were the first receiver of the
distress call. Hence, the author claims that the two conditions are satisfied and there
is a possibility that jurisdiction is given to Italy. (Papastavridis, 2020).

2.4

Interdiction and the state’s maritime policy in Australia

In his work, Marmo (2017) highlights the CPCF case in 2014 with the executive and
the judicial decisions by comparing it to the Hirsi case. The purpose of Marmo’s
work is to analyze how judicial globalization goes based on the two case laws with
different political backgrounds. The reason is that both incidents occurred beyond the
territorial seas and non-refoulement is one of the key points. At first, the author
writes about how the Australian policy against migrants flowed in the past by
referring to the Tampa case in 2001 (VCCL v. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs, 2001). This case was a turning point in Australian history since
the state tightened their migration policy right after Tampa by amending the Migrant
Act 1958. Additionally, Australia started Operation Relax to strengthen the border
security in the wake of this case. Several years later, Australia also experienced a
surge of migrant influx between 2006 and 2013, which led to a stricter security
policy. This is how Australia strengthened their border security over the course of
time. With regards to the Hirsi and the CPCF cases, Marmo (2017) indicates that
both have several similarities since the authorities took place interdiction during the
routine operations and the military officers took onboard to detain without any
identification procedures. A key difference is the courts’ decisions about non-
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refoulement. Whilst the High Court of Australia decided that the whole interdiction
procedure at sea was lawful in the CPCF case, the ECtHR found a violation in the
Hirsi case. In this regard, what is particularly found through the CPCF case is a
strong and swift political movement. As a matter of fact, the author points out that
while the judges were contemplating the CPCF case, the government immediately
passed several updates to the Migration Act 1958 and the Maritime Powers Act 2013
(MPA) in order to remove migrants in the high seas without violating any national
laws. Consequently, the MPA had a huge influence on the case because the
legislation was passed in December 2014, which was just one month before the court
took a final judgement of the CPCF case. These political swift movements clearly
characterize Australian policy. Moreover, the judicial and the executive are closely
linked in re-organizing the legislations and irregular migrant policies. In the end, the
author concludes that the judiciary will have a key role to deal with irregular
migration matters, in contrast to the executive’s effort trying to decrease the
significance of the courts (Marmo et al, 2017).
Lamichhane (2017) tackles the matter of non-refoulement from a different direction
by citing another case law. In the Sale case, the Supreme Court of the United States
of America once mentioned that the USA is not under the obligation of nonrefoulement regarding interception operations beyond the territorial seas (Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, 1993). The court also indicated that the right of nonrefoulement should be limited only in the state’s territory. The purpose is to avoid a
concern with regard to inappropriately broad reading of Article 33 of the Refugee
convention. It is also claimed that the drafters’ initial thought of the non-refoulement
provision did not go beyond the territorial seas. Therefore, the convention applies so
long as the state is engaged in its operation in the territorial seas. Looking at
Australia, the Full Federal Court of Australia once stated in the V872/00A case that
there is no duty to decrease the state’s sovereign rights and the regulations of border
security simply because of the purpose of non-refoulement (V872/00A v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2002). Hence, it is obvious that
Australia’s policy has been historically strict on irregular migrants trying to enter the
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country. Even in the CPCF case, the High Court judged that the state did not violate
non-refoulement.
On the other hand, the UNHCR argued about the CPCF case that the obligation of
non-refoulement applies to the state parties of the Refugee Convention wherever it
exercises jurisdiction (UNHCR, 2015). They also mentioned that Australia is bound
to follow its obligations in good faith and Australian internal laws do not change its
international obligations. Lamichhane (2017) also introduced the perspective from
the Human Rights Committee that a state may be held accountable for human rights
violations even if it happens beyond the territorial seas if these is a causal connection
between an interdiction operation and a violation. To supplement this theory, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights once stated that the court disagreed
with the Sale case and they found a violation of non-refoulement regarding the
interdiction operation in the high seas. The court reasoned that if there is a significant
risk of violation of the Refugee Convention, the state may be in violation of the
covenant (The Haitian Center for Human Rights et al. V. United States, 1997).
Finally, the author concluded that while the Refugee Convention remains silent on
several cases, the ECtHR and the Treaty Bodies reaffirmed the effectiveness of the
convention beyond the territorial seas (Lamichhane, 2017).
In her work, Moreno-Lax (2019) views the CPCF case from both non-refoulement
and SAR operation perspectives. The author indicates that the CPCF case is a typical
example of an argument with two points: a rescue operation and a place of safety. As
for the rescue operation, although Australian authority detained the migrants onboard
the vessel “SIEV885” located 16 nautical miles from Christmas Island, they took the
migrants to India as per the order from the National Security Committee of Cabinet
in Australia. This entire process took a month and the migrants were kept onboard
during the whole time. The migrants later argued that the operation going to India
was unreasonable as there is no agreement of disembarkation of migrants between
Australia and India. The author cited the judge’s comment saying that “removal must
be to a reasonable place and within a reasonable time”. The other judge also states
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“only limitation on the power was that it be exercised reasonably in good faith”. For
those reasons, the author claims that the choice of destination and the period of
detaining onboard are arguable. Additionally, since no evidence suggests that there is
no fear for migrants after they enter India, the Australia’s operation and lengthy
detention do not fulfill the obligation under the principle of non-refoulement. In
particular, given the fact that India has not ratified the Refugee Convention, it is
difficult to predict that India is a place to offer such a protection.
As India is unlikely to be considered as a place of safety, her work further examines
to seek where could be the “place of safety” under the SAR convention and the
SOLAS convention. In light of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Guidelines issued in 2004, a ship cannot be a place of safety because a ship is only a
temporary place of safety and it does not satisfy the meaning of the original term. In
the CPCF case, the author argues that Christmas Island seems a suitable place as a
destination due to the distance from the rescuing point. A contentious point is that
both the SAR convention and the SOLAS convention do not mandate a disembarking
point as the closest land. Even so, the author mentions that Christmas Island is the
most possible option because both the SAR convention and the SOLAS convention
require to disembark rescuees as soon as reasonably practicable (Moreno-Lax et al,
2019).
Klein (2014) claims that a key legislation to assessing the CPCF case is the MPA.
Article 18 of the MPA allows maritime officers to exercise law enforcement power
such as detaining, boarding and searching against foreign ships or ships without a
nationality in the contiguous zone. In terms of a place of safety, Article 72 states that
maritime officers are allowed to take a vessel to a port or another place that is
regarded as an appropriate place. Even if the place is outside of Australia, it is still
acceptable. Maritime officers can also change the destination of migrants in the
middle of transferring at any time if necessary. Therefore, in the CPCF case,
authorities are widely granted the power of law enforcement at sea and the
interdiction operation was conducted in accordance with the MPA. When it comes to
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the detention period against irregular migrants at sea, Article 74 stipulates that
maritime officers are not allowed to keep a person onboard unless the officer is
satisfied. It also says that an officer needs to recognize that the situation is safe for
people onboard before the authority releases migrants. In other words, it is possible
to keep migrants onboard until the authority is “satisfied” on reasonable grounds. In
response to this, Klein (2014) argues that migrants are protected by the principle of
non-refoulement written in the MPA. Looking at Article 95, it requires to ensure
human rights protections by saying;
A person arrested, detained or otherwise held under this Act must be treated
with humanity and respect for human dignity, and must not be subject to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Even so, the Court disagreed with the claim that the maritime officers violated the
principle of non-refoulement in the CPCF case. The officers’ act was recognized
within the scope of the MPA. Even so, it is indicated that there might be other
international human rights conventions applicable with the principle of nonrefoulement. For example, non-refoulement is written in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT) to which Australia is
a state party. Therefore, it could be possible that the refugees claim human rights
obligation with the above conventions (Klein, 2014).

2.5

Result of literature review

This section summarizes several key points that were brought up in this chapter.
In Chapter 2.1, Guilfoyle (2009) describes that interdiction could be divided into a
two-step process. Arresting as the second step requires more law enforcement power
and legal basis than the first step: boarding, inspecting and searching. The author
also mentions the three actors that conduct interdiction at sea. Coastal states, flag
states and third states could be all actors but there are different law instruments
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applied to each state (Guilfoyle, 2009). Tsaltas (2010) interprets interdiction in a
more extensive way by mentioning the three rights. The rights of approach, enquiry
and seizure are generally accepted for authorities but the author also claims the
complexity of applicability of these rights in the high seas. Freedom of navigation is
widely recognized as the right of all ships in the above area (Tsaltas, 2010). Coppens
(2012) tackles the matter of interdiction differently since the right of approach could
be excluded from the principle of interdiction. The author also argues the vagueness
of the definitions between interdiction and interception. Although there is no official
recognition of the difference, it is widely regarded that the word “interception” has a
broader meaning than “interdiction” (Coppens, 2012).
In Chapter 2.2, Ratcovich (2019) introduces the general term of a SAR operation.
The duty of rescue written in Article 98 of the UNCLOS is divided into two parts: all
vessels and maritime authorities. The latter is required to establish a SAR operation,
if necessary, with other states (Ratcovich, 2019). Mallia (2009) brings up some
potential issues under the current legal instrument of the rescue conventions. Since
the SAR convention was established a long time ago, it does not match emerging
cases such as mass migrants at sea. For example, the term of disembarkation is
unclear because it could be several places under the SAR convention. While some
nations have updated its border guard policy, the SAR convention has still been
silent on the issue of mass migrants. Similarly, a false distress call could be
problematic as some migrants might take advantage of the duty of rescue from
commercial ships. It is said that some crew members are threatened by migrants to
change the destination at their will (Mallia, 2009). Ghezelbash (2018) further extends
the topic to the ambiguity between interdiction and SAR operations. As an example,
his work points out the possibility that Australian authority claims a SAR operation
in order to avoid responsibilities caused by interdiction. This trend was even
strengthened by launching Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013. As the authority
keeps operational information secret, it is hard to examine if the authority conducts
interdiction or a SAR operation. In this case, the authority could switch from
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interdiction to a SAR operation so long as they remain silent about their maritime
activities (Ghezelbash, 2018).
In Chapter 2.3, after several new cases occurred recently in Italy, there is room for a
discussion whether or not an indirect approach falls within the past case laws in the
ECtHR. Pijnenburg (2020) explains how Italy’s interdiction methods have changed
since the MoU between Italy and Libya in 2017. The author spotlights the “aid of
assistance” method, also called indirect approach, to irregular migrants through the
LCG. Italy started adopting this method after their claim was denied in the Hirsi
case. There is an obvious link between financial assistance as well as technical
support and the breach of the international obligation. Hence, jurisdiction should be
given to Italy by referring to the Al-Skeini case and the Women on waves case. On
the other hand, Kim (2017) recognizes a limited scope of jurisdiction and took a
different approach to this issue. The author finds a possible violation of the
ARSIWA. According to Article 16 and 47, even if one state merely supports the
other country, both might be to blame if two states are involved in the same wrongful
act. Moreover, a violation could be found under the “positive due diligence”
obligation of international laws on the condition that jurisdiction is given beyond the
territorial seas.
Moreno-Lax (2020) extends the previous two authors’ theory further by mentioning
the S.S and others case in the Mediterranean Sea. Her work highlights two facts.
Firstly, the LCG vessel was donated by Italy. Secondly, the Italian authorities were
merely in the distress area without taking any action. The author introduces a new
theory called a “proxy” system provided that Italy had an adequate amount of
“effective control” over migrants on the boat through the LCG. Lastly, Papastavridis
(2020) finds the conditions of establishing jurisdiction by citing the Al-Skeini case.
Given the fact that there are a personal case and a spatial case, the former one might
apply to the S.S and others case. The author also considers the possibility of a SAR
operation that could be used as an exception. However, jurisdiction might be still
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given to Italy because there was a clear recognition and an existence of coordinator
by Italian authorities.
In Chapter 2.4, several authors tackle potential problems of Australian interdiction
operations at the center of the CPCF case. Marmo (2017) and Lamichhane (2017)
view the case through the principle of non-refoulement, whilst Moreno-Lax (2020)
and Klein (2014) consider the case from the aspect of SAR operations along with
human rights concerns.
Marmo (2017) compares the CPCF case with the Hirsi case in order to examine a
judicial globalization between the two regions with different political backgrounds.
The cases have similarities as both happened outside of the territorial seas. In
addition, the principle of non-refoulement is at the center of the arguments. The
author particularly points out that Australian political movement with the immediate
update of the Migrant Act and the MPA, which happened during the court’s
procedure of the CPCF case. It is also found that the judiciary and the executive are
closely connected in modifying the legislations and migrant policies.
On the one hand, Lamichhane (2017) has a different approach to the CPCF case by
referring to the Sale case in the USA. Since the Court denied the involvement of nonrefoulement outside of the territorial seas, the author emphasizes that applicability of
non-refoulement in the high seas is not a uniform decision throughout the world. In
this regard, his work has a opposite view because there is still a possibility that a
state is responsible for human rights violations outside of the territorial seas. The
case of The Haitian Center for Human Rights is one example that the court found a
violation of non-refoulement in the contiguous zones.
Moreno-Lax (2019) particularly focuses on the rescue operation of the CPCF case
regarding the destination and the detention period onboard. After reviewing the SAR
convention, the SOLAS convention and the IMO guidelines, the author claims that
Christmas Island is the most plausible option as a place of safety given the distance
from the rescuing point and the requirement of prompt dismemberment by the related

23

conventions. hence, the author argues that the authority’s action might be against the
principle of non-refoulement because the authority tried to take the migrants to India
and the entire procedure took a month.
Klein (2014) highlights the MPA and its influence on rescue operations in Australia.
Despite the fact that Australia is a state party of the Refugee Convention, the author
recognizes that the MPA grants a wide range of enforcement power to maritime
officers including taking refugees outside of the territory, detaining migrants until
officers are satisfied with reasonable grounds. However, it might be against the
ICCPR and the CAT conventions because those legislations contain the clause of
human rights obligations. Hence, the refugees could claim a violation of the ICCPR
and the CAT as Australia is a state party of both conventions.
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Chapter 3 Analysis
In Chapter 3, this paper will examine the states’ background including key
legislations and policies in Italy and Australia in order to evaluate how the trend
changed over the course of time and understand characteristic methods in each
country. In addition, legal instruments in the contiguous zones, the exclusive
economic zones and the high seas will be highlighted since the UNCLOS and other
key conventions are the bases of analyzing irregular migrants entering a foreign
country.

3.1

Background of migrant issues in Italy and the Mediterranean

This section will examine migrant issues in Italy and other Mediterranean countries.
Even though Italy’s issue is the focal point of this research, neighboring countries,
including northern and southern Mediterranean countries, should be also mentioned
as maritime migrants depart and arrive in multiple states through the Mediterranean
Sea route.
In Europe, maritime migrants from African and the Middle Eastern countries is one
of the biggest concerns. Based on the UNHCR report, over one hundred thousand
people arrived in northern Mediterranean countries in 2019 (UNHCR, 2021). From
the migrants’ view, the Mediterranean route is a major route going to Europe since it
is geographically close to the southern part of the Europe. However, going across the
ocean with unreliable boats takes a lot of risks; therefore, allegedly over a thousand
people died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2019 and almost 30 percent of victims were
children (UNHCR, 2021). Looking at Africa, people generally choose close
countries from Europe as a departure point and one of the examples is Libya.
Knowing that the current regime in the state is not stable and functioning well, Libya
became an ideal nation for irregular maritime migrants to go to Italy, Malta and
Greece (Cusumano et al, 2020). Morocco is another principal state for people
seeking a chance to reach Europe. People tend to choose Libya and Morocco
especially after the EU – Turkey statement in 2016, which basically blocked off the
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“Eastern route”. Therefore, both the central and the western routes appear to be the
major ones that a lot of migrants take (Ippolito et al, 2020). As for the EU – Turkey
deal, the main purpose is to send migrants back to Turkey without any formal asylum
application process in order to decrease the influx of migrants. In return, the EU
offers financial and technical supports to Turkey (BBC, 2016). This influenced on
the migrants’ flow as the present statistics say that the amount of people coming to
Europe through the Mediterranean route has been decreasing (UNHCR, 2021). The
report also indicates that the hot spot of maritime migrants in the Southern
Mediterranean area slightly shifted now to the western side, which includes Morocco
and Algeria.
Another thing that should be taken into consideration is the COVID situation. Due to
the coronavirus restrictions, several states refuse to give a safe port to humanitarian
NGO ships engaged in SAR operations in the Mediterranean Sea (Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2021). From the
humanitarian perspective, it might deteriorate migrants’ health conditions and
alternative measure should be considered.
As for the European policy, the issue of irregular migrants is not a brand-new topic.
Looking at the past event, the Barcelona Declaration in 1996 already tackled migrant
issues between the European and Arab states in order to strengthen their cooperation
and reduce the pressure of migrant matters amongst the member states (Ippolito et al,
2015). Following the Declaration, the European Mediterranean Partnership was
established to improve the circumstances of economy, society and the fundamental
human rights of immigrants in the EU (European Commission, 2020).
In recent history, a remarkable event that influenced on the European policy was a
migrant surge, which is generally referred as a “refugee crisis” in 2015 and 2016.
This phenomenon led to a number of changes in the European policies intended to
enhance the control of migrant flows. First, in response to the migrant surge, the
“European Integrated Border Management” was legally defined for the first time by
the regulation in 2016 (European Union, 2016). The purpose of this regulation is to
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enhance the boarder management and SAR operations by enacting 13 legislative acts
in total. Subsequently, the function of the FRONTEX was strengthened in order to
improve the limitation of personnel and necessary assets. At the same time, the
“European Border and Coast Guard” was established as a new FRONTEX.
With regard to maritime operations, “Operation Sophia” of the European Union
Naval Force Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med)
was launched in 2015. It aimed for supporting the LCG missions and law
enforcement activities in the wake of the migrant shipwrecks that originally came
from Libya. According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
the number of migrants from Libya exponentially surged in 2014 and 2015
(UNSMIL, 2015). Therefore, the EU states tried to decrease the flow by giving
assistance such as capacity building programs to Libyan officers with the aim of
shifting the responsibility to Libya and controlling the situation of migrants. Another
significant event is the Malta Declaration in 2017, having new cooperation measures
between Europe and Libya to strengthen the relationship even further by funding and
donating equipment (European Council, 2017). As such, the European countries
have been spotlighting on the Libyan situation since the migrant surge in 2015.
Furthermore, Operation Sophia officially ended and was replaced by Operation Irini,
which also focused off the coast of Libya by monitoring violations until 2023.
Based on the background of maritime migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, this study
will focus on Italy from this point. Italy has been a major destination for maritime
migrants mainly from North Africa over the past couple of decades due to its
geographical position from Africa (Vari, 2020). As a matter of fact, between the year
of 2015 and 2016, over 335,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy through the
Mediterranean route (Scotto, 2017). On the departure side, Libya is one of the
biggest leaving points for migrants going to Italy. Based on the UNHCR report, over
90% of migrants who reached the Italian coast came from Libya in 2017 and 2018
(UNHCR, 2018). However, this number significantly dropped after the year of 2018
due to the strengthened cooperation between Italy and Libya. Moreover, the fact that
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a lot of migrants come from Libya does not mean that the migrants’ nationality is
mostly Libyan. The same UNHCR report mentions that dominant nationalities
among migrants are Tunisia, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Pakistan and so on.
Aside from the Libyan case, another major departure point to go to Italy is Tunisia.
After the number of migrants from Libya significantly dropped in 2018, migrants
started choosing Tunisia as an alternative port. Although maritime migrants from
Tunisia took up only less than 5 percent in the entire migrants in Italy in 2017, the
number increased to 43 percent in 2020 (UNHCR, 2020). To sum it up, whilst Libya
has been one of the major departure points for a long time, Tunisia recently emerged
as an alternative country for maritime migrants due to the tightened migration policy
between Italy and Libya.
With regard to the flow of the migration policy in Italy, it could be roughly divided
into two categories: before and after the Hirsi case. It is because the Hirsi case gave
a huge influence on the European states’ migrant policy. Before the Hirsi case, Italy
and Libya had a lot of agreements including the protocol in 2007, the treaty in 2008
and the executive protocol in 2009 in order to control migrant issues (Vari, 2020).
However, since Italy’s maritime operation against migrants was condemned due to
the violation of the non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsions in
the Hirsi case in 2012, Italy temporarily stopped the migrant “push-back” operation.
That said, this case was not the end of discussion. In 2017, Italy and Libya reached a
new MoU to reinforce the border security and develop further cooperation (Palm,
2017). The major difference of Italy’s policy between before and after the Hirsi case
is that while Italy took a direct approach to migrants in the past, the state began to
have more indirect approaches by providing financial, training and asset support to
Libya. This MoU was even renewed in 2020 with continuing support from Italy to
Libya (Abdallah, 2021).
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3.2

Background of migrant issues in Australia

Australia is a democratic nation which historically accepted a lot of irregular
maritime migrants from the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia (Missbach,
2015). Since the nation is geographically isolated from neighboring countries,
migrants usually use a boat trying to reach the Australian coast. Every time Australia
encountered the huge influx of migrants, the nation created a number of protocols
and regulations in order to tighten its border security (Hassan et al, 2020).
Accordingly, the number of migrants decreased. Looking at the past events, the state
has experienced two migrant surges since 2000, based on the report of the Parliament
of Australia (Parliament of Australia, 2017). The report says that the first migrant
surge occurred in 2001, at which time 54 boats were found off the coast of Australia.
The number decreased to 19 boats in 2002 mainly because of Australia’s revised
protocol and the new maritime operation. The second surge happened in 2012 with
403 boats. However, the number decreased again to 104 boats in 2013 and only 1
boat in 2014 due to the new legislation called the MPA. The main difference
between Italy and Australia is that while Italy’s migrant policy heavily relies on the
EU policy and operations, there is relatively less pressure on Australia in changing
its policy because Australia is not a part of a regional framework such as EU.
Instead, Australia has established the MoU with several Pacific countries and
Southeast Asian countries. For instance, Papua New Guinea and Nauru are important
states for Australia because there are offshore processing centers in those countries.
The centers were built in order to accept migrants from Australia. As a result, over
3,000 people have been sent from Australia to the above two nations since 2013
(Refugee Council of Australia, 2021). Malaysia and Cambodia are also the nations
that decided to accept migrants from Australia after having MoU with Australia
(Hassan et al, 2020).
In terms of Australian policy, a fundamental legislation regarding migrants is the
Migration Act 1958, which prohibits the arrival of irregular migrants through the
ocean without visa (Klein, 2014). This legislation was later amended, triggered by
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the first surge of migrants including the case VCLL, so called “Tampa incident” in
2001 (VCCL v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, 2001). This
sudden increase caused a major change in Australian policy. Soon after the Tampa
incident, the Howard regime announced that the state introduced the “Pacific
Solution”, which includes an amendment of the Migration Act to introduce a new
border guard regime (Roam, 2017). Furthermore, the government launched
Operation Relex to strengthen the border control by intercepting ships in the
contiguous zones and pushing them back to outside of the Australian territorial seas
(Klein, 2014). Interestingly, however, these events do not mean that Australia has
been maintaining strict measures against maritime migrants since 2001. This is also
true that Australia temporarily stopped strict border control for several years after the
Tampa incident. In 2008, when Rudd became the Prime Minister, he decided to
suspend the Pacific Solution as a part of his new policy (Grewcock, 2008).
Consequently, the number of irregular migrant boats increased again from 23 to 117
between 2008 and 2009. In response to this, the following Prime Minister Gillard
resumed the Pacific Solution in 2012 after being sworn in.
The second surge of irregular maritime migrants happened in 2012. Following the
event, the circumstances in Australia drastically changed since the government
enacted the MPA in 2013. The legislation includes several strict measures against
migrants. Article 72 of the MPA states that Australian officers are authorized to
require a boat to stop, detain migrants at sea and possibly take them to another place
if there are reasonable grounds (Australian Government, 2013). These maritime
authorizations are arguable because some claim that this is against the principle of
non-refoulement and the Refugee Conventions (Hassan et al, 2020). In addition to
the MPA, a new operation called “Sovereign Borders” was introduced in 2013 by
Prime Minister Abbott (McDonald, 2015). The purpose of the operation is to secure
the border guard and monitor unauthorized boats. According to the government, this
new operation is explained with strong words that;
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Anyone who attempts an unauthorized boat voyage to Australia will be
turned back to their point of departure, returned to their home country or
transferred to another country. No-one who travels illegally to Australia by
boat will be allowed to remain in Australia (Australian Government, 2021).
This authorized “push-back” operation successfully reduced the number of migrant
boats at sea. Moreover, it is important to realize that the government keeps
operational information secret under Operation Sovereign Borders. In 2013, the
Prime Minister Morrison officially announced that the government will not reveal
information when asylum seekers boats were turned back by the authority (ABC
news, 2013).
After the new operation, there were some controversial cases regarding interdiction
of maritime migrants conducted by the maritime authority in addition to the CPCF
case, which this paper introduced in Chapter 2. For example, the “Suspected
Irregular Entry Vessel 885 (SIEV-885)” with 153 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees was
intercepted in the contiguous zone in 2014 (Jark v. Minister for Immigration and
Border Protection, 2014). Allegedly, the vessel was in distress as it almost ran out of
fuel due to the oil leak. After that, people were taken by Australian authority and
disembarked in Papua New Guinea (IMO, 2018). Although there is no sufficient
information revealed publicly, there is a possibility that Australian interdiction is
against the rescue obligations since the authority had no right to interdict a vessel
until the rescue operation ends.
To summarize, the migration matter is one of the most important topics in Australia
and the policy changes from regime to regime. As for major events, Australia
historically enacted its own legislations including the Migration Act in 1958 and the
MPA in 2013 with corresponding maritime operations in order to strengthen the
border guard. Especially, the Pacific Solution and the MPA authorize maritime
officers to interdict migrant boats in a strict way by towing to outside of the
Australian maritime area. As for the judicial decisions, the High Court of Australia is
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historically in favor of the authority side in relation to the Tampa, the CPPF and the
SIEV-885 cases.

3.3

Legal instrument in the contiguous zones

From this section, this study will examine legal instruments in the contiguous zones,
the exclusive economic zones and the high seas. According to the UNCLOS Article
33, contiguous zones are the area that a coastal state exercises the necessary control
to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial seas. To put it another way, a coastal state
is not obliged to exercise its jurisdiction in the contiguous zones and a state is merely
allowed to do so (Ratcovich, 2019). Looking at the UNCLOS Article 33, the Item A
can only apply to incoming vessels as preventive measures cannot be taken to
outgoing vessels. On the other hand, the Item B can only apply to outgoing vessels
since an incoming ship may breach a coastal law within the territorial seas only after
it passes the limit of the territorial seas (Tanaka, 2019). In applying this article to
incoming vessels, a nexus to the territorial seas of the coastal state is a key point. If a
vessel simply passes through the contiguous zones, it does not satisfy the
requirements by Article 33.
In terms of jurisdiction, Ratcovich claims that Article 33 implies that it only contains
enforcement jurisdiction, but not prescriptive jurisdiction (Ratcovich, 2019).
However, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) mentions that this is
contentious because two interpretations could be found: a narrow interpretation and a
broad interpretation. While a narrow interpretation follows Ratcovich’s view, a broad
one asserts that a coastal state is allowed to regulate a violation of domestic law in
the contiguous zones only for limited circumstances (IOM, 2018). In addition,
Tanaka (2019) supports the narrow definition because an infringement of internal
laws of a coastal state in the contiguous zones is out of the scope of Article 33
(Tanaka, 2019).
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One of the controversial points in the contiguous zones is the definition of
“necessary control” under Article 33. The UNCLOS does not define the clear
meaning of what actions a coastal state can take in the area. For example, in the
CPCF case, the Australian authority not only interdicted the migrants but took them
to Papua New Guinea, which is outside of Australian jurisdiction. However, it is
questionable to what extent an authority is allowed to enforce its law enforcement
power in the contiguous zones. One claims that there is a broad view that a coastal
state may take necessary and proportionate power to conduct law enforcement
operations in the contiguous zones (Klein, 2017). The other author states that Article
111 of the UNCLOS may be a manifestation of the methods. The reason is that the
provision allows authorities to have concrete methods including the right to stop,
arrest and escort a ship to the port in the contiguous zones (Tanaka, 2019). In
response to this theory, there is a further claim that the hot pursuit against outbound
ships and exercising law enforcement against inbound ships have a crucial difference
because no offence has yet to be committed by the latter case (Shearer, 1998).
Hence, it is questionable if Article 33 allows a coastal state to exercise as much law
enforcement power as Article 111 does. In this case, establishing a legislation of a
coastal state might supplement the provision of Article 33 for further clearance.

3.4

Legal instrument in the exclusive economic zones

In Article 56 of the UNCLOS, it describes a general scope and a limitation of law
enforcement by coastal states in the exclusive economic zones. Especially, exercising
of its power is restricted for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving marine
resources. In addition, the exclusive economic zones are not a part of the high seas
and the area could be regarded as a sui generis zone (Tanaka, 2019). The reasoning
is that Article 86 stipulates “the provisions of the Part VII of the UNCLOS apply to
all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone”. Therefore,
the two maritime zones are clearly differentiated. On the one hand, basic legal
consideration in the high seas can apply to the exclusive economic zones as vessels
are given the freedom of navigation based on Article 58 of the UNCLOS, unless
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otherwise stated (IOM, 2018). Concerning irregular maritime migration, it appears to
be clear that a matter of the special jurisdictional rights does not include migration
issues in the exclusive economic zones because the immigration concern is not
included in the aims of this zone. Looking at the Hirsi case, interdiction was
conducted by Italian authority thirty-five nautical miles away from the south coast of
Italy (Papanicolopulu, 2013). This area is basically considered as the exclusive
economic zone but the legal instruments of the high seas were generally applied to
the case. Overall, it is reasonable to say that migrant issues in the exclusive economic
zones can be fundamentally considered as it happens in the high seas unless irregular
migrants are on a fishing vessel conducting the activities under Article 56 of the
UNCLOS.

3.5

Legal instrument in the high seas

The high seas are composed of all parts of the ocean except for internal waters,
territorial seas, contiguous zones and the exclusive economic zones. Since no state is
allowed to claim sovereignty in the high seas, states fundamentally have no legal
reasoning to interfere with foreign ships. With respect to the legal framework in the
high seas, two factors need to be considered: the principle of freedom and the
principle of fairness (Guilfoyle, 2015). The principle of freedom is written in Article
87 of the UNCLOS. For example, all states have an equal right to enjoy the freedom
of activities including navigation, overflight and conducting a scientific research
subject to Part VI and XIII of the UNCLOS. Apparently, this primary principle
applies to irregular maritime migrants on boats. However, although all flag ships are
given this right of freedom, it must be remembered that states are bound to other
legislations in the high seas. The UNCLOS Article 94 stipulates that a state’s duties
such as exercising its jurisdiction and controlling over ships flying its flag. In other
words, no sovereignty does not mean no legal basis in the high seas. Flag states have
exclusive sovereignty and a responsibility over their flag ships, which is written in
Article 92 of the UNCLOS.
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Furthermore, even though states are given the freedom to enjoy its voyage in the
high seas, there are mainly two exceptions. The right of visit and the right of hot
pursuit are written in Article 110 and 111 of the UNCLOS respectively. In terms of
the right of visit, a warship is required to find a reasonable ground for suspecting that
the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting or without any
nationality. Since exercising its force in the high seas interferes with the right of
freedom, the right of visit is strictly limited (Ratcovich, 2019). Some authors also say
that the definition of “reasonable ground” should be stringently viewed and general
doubt and assumption cannot be related to a particular ship (Klein, 2011). Because
the right of visit is an “exception” from the principle of freedom, the conditions of
exercising law enforcement power must be set high. For instance, the ECtHR found a
violation of Article 1 of the ECHR by the French authority in the Medvedev case as
explained in the section 2.3. Since extraterritorial law enforcement power should be
limited in general, the action taken by maritime authorities is highly scrutinized in
the high seas. Concerning irregular maritime migrants, two factors might have
possibly fallen under this article. First, a migrant boat having no nationality or
refusing to raise its flag, considered as a stateless vessel, seems to give the right of
visit to states by Article 110 (d) of the UNCLOS. Second, a state is also allowed to
exercise the right of visit if a ship is possibly engaged in a slave trade with
reasonable ground under Article 110 (b). According to Article 13 of the Convention
on the High Seas, every state can take “effective measures” to prevent a slave trade
in the high seas. However, it is hard to recognize whether or not a slave trade is
conducted in the high seas as the definition of slavery and trafficking do not
necessarily match the current trends (IOM, 2018). Indeed, the definitions of
“slavery” and “slave trade” are stipulated in the 1956 Supplementary Slavery
Convention (Papastavridis, 2013). Considering the time that the convention was
created, even though human trafficking might be interpreted as a slavery trade in the
modern world, the definition should be revised in order to tailor to contemporary
migrant issues. Aside from a slave trade, smuggling of maritime migrants is another
issue that a state needs to consider. The 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol is the
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fundamental treaty dealing with migrant smuggling and supplementing the United
Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime (Tanaka, 2019). Article 8
provides that a state party may take necessary procedures such as boarding and
searching vessels with a flag state’s consent if a state has reasonable grounds to
suspect the vessel. To put it another way, interdiction in the high seas under this
protocol requires a flag ship’s agreement based on the concept of the exclusive
sovereignty of flag states in this particular area.
Another exception is the right of hot pursuit prescribed in Article 111 (2) of the
UNCLOS. Unlike the right of visit applying only in the high seas, the right of hot
pursuit is relevant to other maritime areas. It is because a state is allowed to
commence an enforcement action in the territorial seas, the contiguous zones or
possibly the exclusive economic zones with certain conditions (IOM, 2018). With
regard to the requirements to conduct hot pursuit, a coastal state needs to commence
that operation in the aforementioned three maritime areas with “good reason to
believe” that a vessel has infringed the coastal state’s laws. Article 110 (1) of the
UNCLOS describes that this applies, mutatis mutandis, for infringements in the
exclusive economic zones (Poulantzas, 2002). In this article, mutatis mutandis means
“with the necessary changes”, meaning that if a coastal state’s regulation can apply
in the exclusive economic zones, the state has the right of the hot pursuit. In fact, the
Tribunal of the Saiga case mentioned that “the question is whether, under the
convention, there was justification for Guinea to apply its custom laws in the
exclusive economic zones” (M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2), 1999). In other words,
justification is a key to applying a coastal state’s regulation in this zone. In light of
possible cases for irregular maritime migrants, this article applies only to outbound
vessels because Article 111 (1) states that “pursuit may only be continued outside the
territorial seas or the contiguous zones if the pursuit has not been interrupted”. Even
so, there is still a possibility that this article applies to migrant boats. For example,
when a migrant boat encounters an authority in the territorial seas or the contiguous
zones and the boat tries to flee from the law enforcement by proceeding towards the
high seas, this may apply (Ratcovich, 2019).
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Chapter 4 Discussion
4.1

The conditions of establishing jurisdiction in the high seas

As explained in Chapter 3.3, the high seas are the unique maritime area because
jurisdiction is generally not given to authorities except for flag states. In principle,
unlike the contiguous zones and the exclusive economic zones, no legal reasoning to
interfere with foreign vessels is accepted. In this regard, a state’s jurisdiction is the
most significant matter to analyze interdiction operations because authorities are not
allowed to intercept migrant boats without jurisdiction. However, looking at case
laws, authorities often intercepted migrant boats in the high seas. Among other
things, the Hirsi case gave a major impact on the European maritime interdiction
policy against migrants. While Australian interdiction operations mostly happen in
the contiguous zones, Italy and other European countries often conduct interdiction
operations in the exclusive economic zones and the high seas. Especially in the
Mediterranean Sea, there are a lot of border lines of the exclusive economic zones
regulated intricately as the Mediterranean Sea is surrounded by multiple countries in
such a semi-closed area. Consequently, this often causes problems because the issue
of migrant boats extends over several countries. Considering the abovementioned
factors, this paper will focus on the Hirsi in order to analyze necessary conditions to
establish a state’s jurisdiction. In addition, other case laws as well as emerging cases
will be brought up to supplement the discussion.
First of all, the focal point of the Hirsi case is whether jurisdiction is given to Italy
although the case occurred in the exclusive economic zone, where the legal
instrument of the high seas basically applies. For this matter, Italy argued that Italian
maritime authority conducted so called ‘push-back operation’ by following the
bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya (Papanicolopulu, 2013). In response to
that, the ECtHR mentioned in the Hirsi case that;
The Court observes that Italy cannot evade its own responsibility by relying
on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya. Even if it
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were to be assumed that those agreements made express provision for the
return to Libya of migrants intercepted on the high seas, the Contracting
States’ responsibility continues even after their having entered into treaty
commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention or its
Protocols in respect of these State. (Paragraph 129)
Therefore, this decision set a vital precedent for other European states that were
aiming to shift its responsibility to third nations by bilateral agreements.
The second point is that what kind of actions could satisfy the conditions of
establishing jurisdiction. In response to this, the ECtHR already stated in the
Medvedyev case, which happened before the Hirsi case that;
In that connection, it is sufficient to observe that in Medvedyev and Others,
cited above, the events in issue took place on board the Winner, a vessel
flying the flag of a third State but whose crew had been placed under the
control of French military personnel. In the particular circumstances of that
case, the Court examined the nature and scope of the actions carried out by
the French officials in order to ascertain whether there was at least de facto
continued and uninterrupted control exercised by France over the Winner and
its crew. (paragraph 80)
The Medvedyev case is the incident that happened in 2002 off West Africa. A French
frigate spotted a Cambodian-flagged ship Winner in the high seas due to the
suspicion of drug trafficking. Since The vessel Winner refused to answer to the radio
contact and they started throwing away several packages containing cocaine in the
ocean, the French members were onboard and confined crews for 13 days until they
entered French territory (Medvedyev and others v. France, 2010). Later on, the
ECtHR stated that;
The Court considers that, as this was a case of France having exercised full
and exclusive control over the Winner and its crew, at least de facto, from the
time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they
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were tried in France, the applicants were effectively within France’s
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. (paragraph 67)
In other words, de facto control over people and the ship suffices the conditions to
establish jurisdiction. In the Hirsi case, the Court cited this interpretation and
maintained its position. Accordingly, the next question is the definition of “de facto”
control. From both Medvedyev and Hirsi cases, exclusive physical contact could be
considered one of the factors consisting of de facto control of states. Moreover,
exercising continuous law enforcement should be considered. As a matter of fact, the
ECtHR mentioned in the Hirsi case that;
The applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto
control of the Italian authorities.” Speculation as to the nature and the
purpose of the intervention of the Italian ships on the high seas would not
lead the Court to any other conclusion. (paragraph 81)
Giuffre (2012) also emphasized that the 10-hour constraint under full control of the
Italian authority clearly played a part in establishing a state’s jurisdiction (Giuffré,
2012). Furthermore, one thing that should be added here is that the ECtHR said de
facto jurisdiction was assessed objectively based on the facts, not the state’s purpose
(Papanicolopulu, 2013).
The third point is the areal matter of de facto control. Since applying this principle in
the high seas is regarded as an extraterritorial interpretation, the ECtHR is generally
careful applying jurisdiction in the high seas. As for Article 1 of the ECHR, it says
that;
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Chapter I of this Convention.
In other words, jurisdiction is not geographically limited as long as the Court finds a
violation no matter where it is. In the Hirsi case, the ECtHR mentioned that;
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The Court has found that a Contracting State has, exceptionally, exercised its
jurisdiction outside its national territory, it does not see any obstacle to
accepting that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction… (paragraph 178)
This is somewhat a brief explanation of the matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction
(Giuffré, 2012). However, it does not mean that the Court did not always keep the
same position in the past. As for the Brankovic case, which happened in 1999 and
NATO’s air strike in Serbia was brought up as an extraterritorial jurisdiction issue,
the ECtHR said;
As to the ‘ordinary meaning of the relevant terms in Article 1 of the
Convention, the Court is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public
international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily
territorial. While international law does not exclude a State’s exercise of
jurisdiction extraterritoriality, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction are, as
a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the
other relevant States. (paragraph 59)
Hence, the ECtHR made its point clear that only some exceptional cases could be
accepted as a matter of the extraterritorial case, though the ECtHR also mentioned
that “a cause-and-effect notion of jurisdiction not contemplated by Article 1 of the
ECHR” (Brankovicand others v. Belgium, 2001). However, in the Medvedyev case,
the ECtHR stated that;
The Court considers that, as this was a case of France having exercised full
and exclusive control over the Winner and its crew, at least de facto, from the
time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they
were tried in France, the applicants were effectively within France’s
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (contrast to
Brankovic and Others, cited above). (paragraph 67)
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As explained above, the ECtHR had an opposite view of the Brankovic case, since
the statement clarified that jurisdiction should be granted to a state even in the high
seas with the condition of de facto control.
Following the Medvedyev case, the ECtHR gave further explanation to this issue
with the Al-Skeini case happened in 2003. In the statement, it confirmed that there
are two conflicting views in the case laws: territorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial
jurisdiction (Al-Skeini and others, 2011). Additionally, the ECtHR claimed that what
matters is an exercise of law enforcement over the person, not over the place.
Therefore, the judge followed Medvedev’s view, which accepts the notion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to a state. Remarkably, in the Al-Skeini case, there is no
direct territorial connection between the state’s territory (United Kingdom) and the
place that the incident happened (Iraq). To sum it up, the ECtHR generally
acknowledged extraterritorial jurisdiction if there is de facto control, which is a
continuous activity by an authority no matter where it happened. The geographical
link between a state and an incident place seems to be required less than before in the
wake of the Al-Skeini case.
However, the Hirsi and other case laws are not comprehensive in tackling emerging
cases lately. One example is the case S.S and others v. Italy, which took place in
2017 off the coast of Libya and both Italian and Libyan maritime authorities were
involved (S.S and others v. Italy, 2019). This is still an ongoing case as of the time of
writing. According to the NGO report, when a migrant boat sent a distress call, both
the LCG vessel and the NGO vessel approached the boat. However, the LCG
obstructed the NGO vessel’s operation and picked up 47 migrants from the boat.
Eventually, the LCG took the migrants back to Libya. The point is that before the
LCG picked up the migrants, the Libyan officers were in contact with the MRCC in
Rome, Italy. This means that there is a possibility that the Italian authority ordered or
asked LCG to send back the migrants to Libya. In addition, the LCG vessel was
donated by Italy based on the MoU in 2017 (Amnesty International, 2021).
Moreover, the Italian navy’s helicopter was in close proximity as a part of the
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maritime operation Mare Sicuro. Consequently, the plaintiff claims that jurisdiction
should be given to Italy.
This incident is closely linked to the discussion in Chapter 2.3, where several authors
approached a matter of jurisdiction from different perspectives. Among other things,
the “proxy system” should be spotlighted since it is an advanced opinion of both
Pijnenburg (2020) and Papastavridis (2020). Based on this new theory, it is claimed
that jurisdiction should be granted to Italy in the S.S and others case because of two
factors: “contactless control” and the “proxy system” (Moreno-Lax, 2020). In other
words, as long as there is a sufficient link between the two states, in addition to de
facto control by the LCG, a jurisdictional link could exist between the states. To
support this theory, Airaksinen (2020) introduces a similar theory. The author claims
the fact that the migrants relying on the Italian MRCC’s coordination triggered
jurisdiction (Airaksinen, 2020). To put it differently, what is a key to establishing
jurisdiction is a law enforcement power that a nation has over people’s lives with a
“long distance de facto control”.
On the other hand, the case laws may not support the aforementioned claim because
physical contact was always found in the cases including Medvedvev, Al-Skeini and
Hirsi. Those case laws required “exercising physical power” for jurisdiction
triggered by a state. Furthermore, Heinänen (2021) claims in a different way that that
jurisdiction cannot be shared between the two states simply because Libya is not a
state party of the ECHR (Heinänen, 2021).
Considering the both views, this paper claims that it seems unlikely that the proxy
system applies to this case. First of all, the ECtHR mentioned that extraterritorial
jurisdiction should be exceptional (Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 2012). Second, in
order to apply the proxy system to this case, it is necessary to prove that Italy’s
MRCC ordered the LCG to send back migrants to Libya. Otherwise, it might be
merely Libya’s responsibility since Libya is a sovereign nation, and not under Italy’s
authority. However, it is difficult to imagine that Italy acknowledges this theory in a
straight way whether or not the MRCC actually did it. Third, looking at the current
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trend of migrant issues in Europe, the case N.D and N.T v. Spain should be
highlighted as a reference (N.D and N.T v. Spain, 2020). A brief summary of this
case is that two migrants were pushed back by the Spanish Border Police to Morocco
after the migrants illegally entered Spanish territory (European Database of Asylum
Law, 2020). The Court initially concluded in 2017 that Spain is to blame because
pushing migrants back is a violation of the ECHR. However, the case was overturned
in 2020. The ECtHR finally reached a different conclusion that there is no breach if
the deportees have caused the collective expulsion by their own “culpable conduct”
(N.D and N.T v. Spain, 2020). Though this is a case on land and does not directly
apply to maritime issues, one thing should be reminded that the ECtHR’s decisions
had been mostly in favor of the plaintiff side before this case. As can be seen in the
Brankovic case and the following incidents, the case N.D and N.T could be a trigger
that the ECtHR alters its own view.
To conclude, the case laws have set a couple of standards in terms of establishing
jurisdiction in the high seas. However, the decisions were not always uniform
because the ECtHR once stated that jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily
territorial in the Brankovic case. After that, the ECtHR acknowledged that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is accepted with a de facto control in a continuous,
uninterrupted manner in the Medvedyev case. The Court maintained this claim in the
Al-Skeini and the Hirsi cases. In the Al-Skeini case, the ECtHR recognized that
exercising law enforcement is over the person, rather than over the state’s
jurisdictional area. That said, the case of S.S and others brought a new discussion
since it does not fall within the definitions of extraterritorial jurisdiction that the case
laws have previously established. As for this new case, the ECtHR might not find a
jurisdictional nexus between Italy and Libya due to the fact that there is no physical
presence by Italy at the scene. Furthermore, without further information to
corroborate a link between Italy and Libya, aside from the MoU and financial and
technical support, it might be overstretching the interpretation of jurisdiction. In
principle, establishing jurisdiction beyond a state’s territory is exceptional and the
meaning should not be stretched in an extensive manner.
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4.2

Applicability of non-refoulement

Applicability of non-refoulement to interdiction operations beyond the territorial seas
is another key point of the irregular maritime migrant issue because if it applies,
states are not allowed to send back people to insecure countries or states that people
fear threats (Tanaka, 2019). However, international conventions including the
Refugee Convention do not have any areal statement. Pertaining to the Refugee
Convention, for example, the principle of non-refoulement is written in Article 33
and it simply mentions;
No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
Although any aerial limitation is not written in this article, it does at least not exclude
the extraterritorial applicability of non-refoulement (Ratcovich, 2019). Moreover,
case laws are not always uniform whether non-refoulement applies beyond the
territorial seas. Therefore, this paper will examine to what extent, and with what
conditions this principle could be applied beyond a state’s territory.
In terms of Italy and Australia, the two nations are both state parties of the Refugee
Convention and the 1967 protocol. These two instruments are the core principle of
non-refoulement which claims that refugees should not be sent back to a country
with the risk of danger (UNHCR, 2019). However, what if irregular maritime
migrants are not refugees? The Refugee Convention only aims to protect the
fundamental human rights of refugees. In this case, even if people who do not fall
within the category of a ‘refugee’ in the Refugee Convention, they may be also
protected by other international law instruments (IMO et al, 2015). For instance, the
ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR include the principle of non-refoulement. In short,
this principle applies to all human beings, no matter what status people have.
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Another major point is to seek if there is a precondition to apply the principle of nonrefoulement. On this matter, the UNHCR made it clear by simply saying;
It (the principle of non-refoulement) applies wherever the State in question
exercises jurisdiction. (UNHCR, 2007)
In other words, the UNHCR claims that once jurisdiction is given to a state, the
nation is under the obligation of non-refoulement regardless of the areal matter. To
supplement this theory, many case laws applied non-refoulement on the basis of
existence of jurisdiction such as the Hirsi case. As jurisdiction is crucial to exercise a
state’s authority, it might create or end legal relationships and obligations
(Lamichhane, 2017).
Considering case laws in Italy and Australia, the two nations have quite opposite
judgements regarding non-refoulement. In Italy, the Hirsi case has expanded the the
non-refoulement applicability to the high Seas. After the ECtHR mentioned that the
principle is found in the ECHR Article 3, the ECtHR stated that;
The Court considers that when the applicants were transferred to Libya, the
Italian authorities knew or should have known that there were insufficient
guarantees protecting the parties concerned from the risk of being arbitrarily
returned to their countries of origin. (paragraph 156)
Remarkably, the Court pointed out Italy’s potential acknowledgement of illtreatment in Libya by saying “authorities knew or should have known”.
Consequently, the extraterritorial application was adopted and Italy was liable for
violating the principle of non-refoulement. The ECtHR also found the breach of
Article 3 in another incident. In the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United
Kingdom, which the applicants were in the custody of the UK troops in Iraq, the
Court mentioned;
For the Court, compliance with their obligations under Article 3 of the
Convention requires the Government to seek to put an end to the applicants’
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suffering as soon as possible, by taking all possible steps to obtain an
assurance from the Iraqi authorities that they will not be subjected to the
death penalty. (paragraph 171)
As is the case of Hirsi, the Court indicated that a lack of the state’s intention of
protecting people under jurisdiction breached Article 3 (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v.
the United Kingdom, 2010). In the wake of the above cases, the wider protection of
Article 3 became clearer in Europe.
On the other hand, the Australian view is opposed to the European one. As for the
CPCF case, the High Court of Australia expressed its view by mentioning that;
Australian courts are bound to apply Australian statute laws even if that law
should violate a rule of international law. International law does not form part
of Australian law until it has been enacted in legislation. (paragraph 462)
Hence, the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement is not valid unless that
provision is incorporated into Australian internal laws. A major contentious point of
the CPCF case is the MPA, which was enacted as a national legislation in 2013.
While the applicant claimed that detaining and taking people to outside of Australia
is a clear violation of non-refoulement, the MPA states in Article 72 that;
A maritime officer may return the person to the vessel or aircraft. (Item 2)
A maritime officer may detain the person and take the person, or cause the
person to be taken, to a place. (Item 4)
The destination may be: (a) in the migration zone; or (b) outside the
migration zone (including outside Australia). (Item 4A)
All in all, the MPA allows maritime officers to detain and take people outside of the
Australian territory. One thing that should be emphasized here is that a political
movement has a huge influence on maritime migrant issues in Australia. As Marmo
(2017) indicated in Chapter 2.4, whilst the judges were processing this case, the
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administration passed several updates regarding the Migration Act and the MPA in
order to legalize interdiction operations in the high seas without violating any
national laws (Marmo et al, 2017). In response to this view, the UNHCR published
its statement in 2014 that;
The power in Chapter 72(4) of the MPA is constrained by Australia’s nonrefoulement obligations. (paragraph 8 (b))
The UNHCR claims again that so long as a state exercises de facto jurisdiction, the
nation should be under the obligation of non-refoulement (UNHCR, 2014). On the
other hand, the Australia’s decision is quite opposite that non-refoulement does not
apply to maritime interception operations in the state. Beside the CPCF case, the
High Court of Australia denied its applicability in the VCCL case in 2001 and the
CPCF case in 2014, which both cases had a potential of violation of non-refoulement
by the push-back operations.
One more thing that the courts have yet to tackle is an extraterritorial applicability of
non-refoulement to an indirect approach, which this study discussed in Chapter 4.1.
In Italy, a primary method that the maritime authority takes is an indirect approach
after the Hirsi case in 2012. Accordingly, applying non-refoulement is possible
because related international laws do not necessarily require a direct, physical
contact. This view is consistent with the UNHCR’s opinion as discussed above
(UNHCR, 2007). Moreover, Italy ratified the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and
the CAT. That said, these international laws did not expect such an indirect approach
when they were established. Hence, further discussions are necessary to apply nonrefoulement against indirect interdiction.
To sum it up, Italy and Australia had opposite judgements in terms of applying nonrefoulement beyond the territorial seas by the courts. Whilst the ECtHR prioritizes a
state’s intention and potential acknowledgement of the negative consequences by its
own action, the Australian Court is coherent to the opposite view. In Australia,
national legislations may override international laws if internal laws do not include
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such a clause in it. In addition, these judgements are still not comprehensive since the
emerging approach, called indirect interdiction operations, has yet to be tackled by
the ECtHR.

4.3

Interpretation of rescue operation

International laws related to SAR operations at sea are an overlapping scheme
nowadays. The most significant conventions are the SOLAS convention, the SAR
convention and the UNCLOS (Ghezelbash et al, 2018). Though SAR should be
separated from interdiction operations, Italy and Australia sometimes argue that
approaching migrant boats at sea is merely a rescue operation, not interdiction as
discussed in Chapter 2.2. Since the activity that an authority picks up migrants and
sends them to another place could seem either interdiction or SAR operation, it is
significant to examine related legal requirements and case laws in order to
differentiate the two maritime operations. For states, SAR operations are also a
political issue as it leads to the matters of migrant acceptance procedures
(Ambrosini, 2018).
The UNCLOS Article 98 requires both authorities and private vessels to rescue “any
person” in danger at sea. Moreover, it also requires coastal states to promote
adequate and effective research. As with the SAR convention and the SOLAS
convention, this article was not established in light of the current issue of irregular
maritime migrants. In the past, a matter of rescuing people to the closest point was
not as complicated as nowadays (IOM, 2018). Currently, this issue is somewhat
intricate since some migrants take advantage of this rescue obligation in order to
arrive a destination by requesting assistance to ships at sea. In light of this matter, the
EU Council established several criteria. According to the guideline, there are several
factors that the master of ship may consider in rescuing. For instance, the availability
of necessary supplies among migrants, the urgent need of medical assistance from a
migrant boat, and the weather conditions are included in the criteria (European
Council, 2010).
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In assessing maritime interdiction and SAR operations, a state’s obligation is a key
point to examining whether the state is responsible for the subsequent actions after
encountering rescuees. Unlike Australia, there are several SAR regions by coastal
states in the Mediterranean seas and this causes the situation further complicated. For
example, Italy once claims that when an incident happens in the state’s SAR area,
which is in the high seas, jurisdiction should not be given to the country due to the
fact that the state simply follows the duty to render assistance. In Hirsi, Italy
mentioned that;
The vessels carrying the applicants had been intercepted in the context of the
rescue on the high seas of persons in distress – which is an obligation
imposed by international law, namely, the UNCLOS and could in no
circumstances be described as a maritime police operation. (paragraph 65)
Italy argued that the obligation to rescue at sea does not create a correlation of
jurisdiction between the state and rescuees. In response to this, the ECtHR stated that
jurisdiction is given since Italy exercised de jure and de fact control over persons as
mentioned in Chapter 5.1 (Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 2012).
When it comes to SAR zones, there is another case found in the Mediterranean seas.
In 2018, Libya officially claimed their new SAR zone which is extended 80 nautical
miles, the high seas (The Times, 2018). The newly extended zone is the area where
most migrants are rescued. A potential reason of extending the SAR zone is to justify
interdiction operations in the high seas by the LCG. Concerning this issue, some
human rights organizations assert that the newly built area should be deleted by the
IMO because Libya is not a safe state and does not provide any safe ports for
migrants (Migreurop, 2020). Even though there is no proof that Italy and Libya prenegotiated on this matter, there is a suspicion that the LCG intended to take more
responsibility for migrants by extending its SAR zone.
Another major point is the definition of a “place of safety” stipulated in rescue
related conventions because neither the SOLAS convention nor the SAR convention
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defines the meaning of it (Ratcovich, 2019). To supplement this, the 2004 IMO
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, define a ‘place of safety’ as
any places that the rescued people’s lives are no longer in danger (Ippolito et al,
2020). The Guideline highlights that a place of safety should be a location where
rescue operations are considered to end. For example, a ship cannot be a place of
safety since a rescue operation is still ongoing.
Based on this term, the key difficulty to understanding a place of safety is the
absence of regulation. For instance, whether a state needs to bring rescuees to the
closest port is uncertain by rescue conventions (Klein, 2014). Looking at the CPCF
case in Australia, the state did not take rescuees to the closest point, which is
Christmas Island. It seems a suitable place due to the distance from the rescue point
given the fact that both the SAR convention and the SOLAS convention require to
disembark as soon as reasonably practicable (Moreno-Lax, 2019). However, simply
judging the case with the distance is questionable since there are only less than 2,000
people living in Christmas Island (Australian Government, 2016). Accordingly, the
capability to treat rescuees is somewhat limited. Hence, the remaining factor that
states need to consider is non-refoulement. It seems reciprocal between international
human rights laws and international rescue laws from the view of the principle of
non-refoulement (Ratcovich, 2019). In this theory, even if a disembarked place is
further than the nearest point, it is reasonable to take rescuees there as long as the
destination is not a place where people do not encounter fear and ill-treatment.
Although there are other factors needed to be considered such as the length of time
and MoU, non-refoulement could be one pillar in assessing the validity of SAR
operations.
To summarize, interdiction operations are sometimes mixed with SAR operations
due to the similarity of the activities. In addition, some maritime authorities might
aim to take advantage of a SAR region for their own benefits. Italy argued in the
Hirsi case that the duty to render assistance and the jurisdiction matter should be
separated since the operation was merely for the rescue purpose. However, this claim
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was denied by the ECtHR whilst Australia have not even tried this theory yet. Libya
is another country that is possibly trying to utilize its SAR region. The nation
recently extended its SAR zone, halfway to the Italian island of Lampedusa.
Allegedly, the possible purpose is to interdict irregular maritime migrants in the high
seas by reasoning with rescue operations. A main difference between Italy and Libya
is that Libya is not a state party of the ECHR; therefore, Libya is not under the
obligation of the legislation.
Furthermore, rescue conventions do not clarify the term of a “place of safety”,
although the IMO guideline expressed a supplemental explanation. One of the
biggest questions is whether the destination must be the closest port. In this regard, it
seems that related conventions do not require such a strict manner. However, nonrefoulement should be considered on this matter given the correlation between
human right laws and rescue laws.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and further research
In the final chapter, this paper outlines the conclusions of this research and proposes
further research regarding interdiction operations against irregular maritime migrants
beyond the territorial seas.

5.1

Conclusions

Interdiction methods often change because it depends on the government’s policy
and states’ cooperation including MoU, bilateral agreements and regional
frameworks. Both Italy and Australia have experienced a migrant surge several times
and there is a long history between the states and irregular maritime migrants. Both
countries have changed their interdiction methods after facing a migrant surge in
order to tighten its border guard. In Italy, cooperation between Italy and neighboring
nations is necessary due to its geographical issue in the Mediterranean Seas. Italy has
reached several agreements with African countries so far but the nation especially
pays attention to Libya. Even though Italy temporarily stopped its interdiction
operations in the high seas after the Hirsi case, the state resumed to reinforce the
collaboration with Libya in the wake of the MoU in 2017. Additionally, since Italy is
a state party of the ECHR, Italy’s interdiction operations are reviewed by the ECtHR
regarding human right matters. Historically, the judicial decisions including the Hirsi
case were not in favor of Italy. Accordingly, the state has no choice but to change the
policy of interdiction methods every time the Court denied the state’s claim.
On the other hand, Australia’s situation is quite opposite since the nation is
geographically isolated from other countries and it is relatively easy to pursue its
own policy. Instead of having regional cooperation, Australia made bilateral
agreements with several countries individually such as Papua New Guinea, Nauru,
Malaysia and Cambodia in order to send migrants to foreign nations. National
legislations also provide a huge law enforcement power to the authority. The Migrant
Act 1958, which was later replaced by the MPA 2013, allows maritime officers to
exercise its law enforcement power beyond the territorial seas. Moreover, one of the
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major points is a judicial decision by the High Court of Australia. Because the
country’s policy is not influenced by neighboring countries or regional frameworks,
the judge is mostly in favor of the authority side.
Furthermore, the matters of jurisdiction, non-refoulement and SAR which this paper
tackled in Chapter 4 are closely linked to each other. The Hirsi case is an example of
the court tackling the above three issues at the same time.
Establishing jurisdiction in the high seas is generally limited to exceptional cases but
the scope was recently stretched a bit after the ECtHR found a condition “de facto
and continued control” in the Medvedyev case as described in Chapter 4.1. This was
not always a uniform perspective from the ECtHR in the past since the court once
mentioned that jurisdiction should be limited to the state’s sovereignty in the
Brankovic case. Even so, through the following case laws including Medvedyev, AlSkeini, and Hirsi, extraterritorial jurisdiction seems to be generally accepted with
continuous, de facto control.
Once jurisdiction is given to a state, the applicability of non-refoulement is another
important matter as this principle protects migrants’ basic human rights from illtreatments by the state. On this issue, the ECtHR and the High Court of Australia
have opposite views. The ECtHR indicates that the principle of non-refoulement
applies wherever jurisdiction is given to states. This view was followed by the
UNHCR and further corroborated by the Al-Saadoon and the Hirsi cases. On the one
hand, Australian cases are different because the court mentioned that the principle of
non-refoulement does not apply unless it has been enacted in legislations (CPCF v.
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 2015). Because the MPA gives
wide range of power of law enforcement to maritime officers, non-refoulement was
denied in several case laws including CPCF and Jark.
SAR operations are often treated as a political matter since its method relies on the
state’s policy. One common thing between Italy and Australia is that both states
claim rescue operations should be treated separately from interdiction operations. In
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other words, the obligation to rescue at sea does not give rise to a link between the
state and the rescuees. This method was later denied by the ECtHR in the Hirsi case.
In addition, the absence of the clear definition of “place of safety” causes arguments
among authors. In this case, non-refoulement should be taken into consideration as
one factor in assessing the validity of rescue operations as Ratcovic (2019) claimed.
Again, the above three matters are not individual topics. They are closely correlated
with each other.

5.2

Further research

The reason that further research is beneficial for the matter of interdiction operations
is because existing case laws are not necessarily comprehensive to apply to emerging
cases. The methods of interdiction operations have been always changing due to
migrant trends, government policies, and regional frameworks in Italy and Australia.
In the past, some interdiction operations were denied by the court such as the Hirsi
case. However, the authorities have no choice but to keep interdicting people at sea
in a different way as irregular maritime migrants continue to come to the states.
As for the latest trend, “indirect approach” which the Italian maritime authorities are
conducting should be spotlighted the most. Whilst case laws cover a wide range of
legal aspects of maritime interdiction operations with physical contact, an indirect
approach is a completely new challenge for both migrants and courts. One of the
examples is the case S.S and others v. Italy. This is an ongoing case and a key point
is whether the indirect approach falls within the definition of jurisdiction in the
ECtHR. Case laws are unlikely to be applied to this case directly because physical
contact was always found in the past cases. A further complicated part is that even if
the court acknowledges jurisdiction in Italy, there would be other issues remained:
non-refoulement and rescue operations.
On the other hand, Australia does not follow the current trend in Europe. It is
because the Australian court is basically in favor of the authority side. Considering
the historical interdiction methods, there is no much difference between the past
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methods and the current ones. To put it in a different way, Australia has no reason to
change its traditional interdiction method due to the favorable judicial decisions to
the state. As long as the current “physical contact” is supported by the court, the
authorities would continue to take the same method. For further research in
Australia, it is important to assess whether interdiction powers exceed beyond the
scope of related conventions. Especially, the MPA introduced in 2013 was a turning
point that Australia started to take a stricter approach to migrants. Furthermore,
judicial decisions are equally as important as the above point. However, given the
past trend, it is unlikely that the Australian court turns its back on the authority
concerning similar cases.
In summary, considering the current geopolitical and socio-economic characters in
Africa and the Middle East, they point to the probability that interdiction operations
in the Mediterranean will continue to play an important role for future time to come.

55

References
ABC news. (2013). Scott Morrison says Government won’t reveal when asylum
seekers boats turned back. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-0923/government-won27t-reveal-when-boats-turned-back/4975742?nw=0
Abdallah, N. (2021). The Legality of the Libya-Italy Memorandum of
Understanding.
https://www.academia.edu/download/66045606/The_Legality_of_the_Libya_
Italy_Memorandum_of_Understanding.pdf
Airaksinen, N. (2020). State Jurisdiction in Search and Rescue Operations-The
Extra-territorial Reach of the European Convention on Human Rights and SS
and Others v. Italy. https://lup.lub.lu.se/studentpapers/record/9010646/file/9019200.pdf
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 61498/08. (2010).
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&v
ed=2ahUKEwi665Xy5PPxAhXySoKHTZyCQIQFjAAegQIBhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fhudoc.echr.coe.int
%2Fapp%2Fconversion%2Fpdf%2F%3Flibrary%3DECHR%26id%3D00197575%26filename%3D00197575.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1LeeFbXMZUw9Le5V0NfDE0
Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, 55721/07 (2011).
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-–-Al-Skeini-and-othersv-united-kingdom-application-no-5572107-7-july-2011
Ambrosini, M. (2018). Irregular immigration in Southern Europe: Actors, dynamics
and governance.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gKVFDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd
&pg=PR5&dq=Ambrosini,+M.+(2018).+Irregular+immigration+in+Southern
+Europe&ots=pLZDoZJR20&sig=EoEfykBEBgW6lDUo6vZdyh2zP4c
Amnesty International. (2021). Italy: Amnesty international and human rights watch
submission to the European Court of Human Rights.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/1398/2019/en/
Australian Government. (2013). Maritime Power Act 2013.
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013A00015
Australian Government. (2016). Christmas Island.
https://www.regional.gov.au/territories/Christmas/christmas_island_census_2
016.aspx

56

Australian Government. (2021). Operation Sovereign Borders.
https://osb.homeaffairs.gov.au/outside-australia
BBC. (2016). Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413
Brankovic and others v. Belgium, 52207/99 (2001).
https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/890.html
Coppens, J. (2012). Migrants in the Mediterranean: do's and don’ts in maritime
interdiction. Ocean Development & International Law, 43(4), 342-370.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320.2012.726834?casa_t
oken=n9sT1qCnEbgAAAAA:vgOxkzx2OWVOpZaFo5d_gz0GztRa29yVY_t96ev87qfIRSh998oC58Dh8vfgS4F
Wg2nrLGyU1w
CPCF v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, S169/2014. (2015).
http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html
Cusumano, E., & Villa, M. (2020). Over troubled waters: maritime rescue operations
in the central Mediterranean. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/68577
European Commission. (2020). Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar14104
European Council. (2010). Supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union (2010/252/EU). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010D0252&from=EN
European Council. (2017). Malta Declaration by the members of the European
Council on the external aspects of migration.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/maltadeclaration/
European Database of Asylum Law. (2020).
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/nd-and-nt-v-spain-grandchamber-rule-return-migrants-morocco-did-not-breach-convention
European Union. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament
and of the council of 14 September 2016. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624

57

Gallagher, A. T., & David, F. (2014). The international law of migrant smuggling.
Cambridge university press.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rHnsAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PR17&dq=Gallagher,+A.+T.,+%26+David,+F.+(2014).+The+internation
al+law+of+migrant+smuggling.+Cambridge+university+press.&ots=MmXY
1iJuIU&sig=BYem1U1NlBD1-6aTHQqYKCsbnAQ\
Ghezelbash, D., Moreno-Lax, V., Klein, N., & Opeskin, B. (2018). Securitization of
search and rescue at sea: the response to boat migration in the Mediterranean
and offshore Australia. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 67(2),
315-351. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-andcomparative-law-quarterly/article/securitization-of-search-and-rescue-at-seathe-response-to-boat-migration-in-the-mediterranean-and-offshoreaustralia/A13E77F859B6A2CB8CE8A44B34FE0DFB
Giuffré, M. (2012). Watered-down rights on the high seas: Hirsi Jamaa and others v
Italy (2012). International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 61(3), 728-750.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-lawquarterly/article/watereddown-rights-on-the-high-seas-Hirsi-jamaa-andothers-v-italy-2012/1F85EBD59A8C0695AC6D37687B4517EF
Grewcock, M. (2008). Systems of exclusion: The Rudd government and the ‘end’of
the Pacific solution.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10345329.2008.12036439
Guilfoyle, D. (2009). Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=drFxa3YUJIgC&oi=fnd&pg
=PR15&dq=Guilfoyle,+D.+(2009).+Shipping+Interdiction+and+the+Law+of
+the+Sea&ots=APZ5W6Duz3&sig=Fdcv68ZCWG5LDESOB8KfXv_gs_w
Guilfoyle, D. (2015). The high seas. In the Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea.
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/abstract/10.1093/law/9780198715481.00
1.0001/law-9780198715481-chapter-10
Hassan, D., & Al Imran, H. (2020). Boat Refugees, International Law and
Australia’s Commitment: An Analysis. Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, 187-241. https://www.jmlc.org/Hassan.pdf
Heinänen, S. (2021). The Extra-territorial Reach of Positive Obligations: the ECtHR
Case of SS and the Others v. Italy.
https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/330078
Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 27765/09 (2012).
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/spa#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-109231%22]}

58

IMO, UNHCR. (2015). Rescue at sea.
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/450037d34/rescue-sea-guideprinciples-practice-applied-migrants-refugees.html
IOM. (2018). Protection of migrants at sea.
https://publications.iom.int/books/protection-migrants-sea
Ippolito, F., & Trevisanut, S. (Eds.). (2015). Migration in the Mediterranean:
Mechanisms of international cooperation. Cambridge University Press.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=EbskCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PR7&dq=Ippolito,+F,+et+al.+(2015).+Migration+in+the+Mediterranean
&ots=61YoogCEqz&sig=sEevfax4rzO13YM_Cz610ftSgP4
Ippolito, F., Borzoni, G., & Casolari, F. (Eds.). (2020). Bilateral Relations in the
Mediterranean: Prospects for Migration Issues. Edward Elgar Publishing.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8732DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PR1&dq=Bilateral+Relations+in+the+Mediterranean+&ots=sEMyUA8S
fL&sig=cyIwtUO3hYq5YERB-aZMPPpdUS4
Jark v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, S147/2014. (2014).
https://jade.io/article/338833
Kenneth W, O. M. M. (2016). Fighting at the legal boundaries: controlling the use of
force in contemporary conflict.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jtMdDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PT11&dq=Fighting+at+the+Legal+Boundaries:+Controlling+the+Use+o
&ots=QIaHbwClSC&sig=pFE4_SHdt--vxn-SZWz_wVBzqJ4
Kim, S. (2017). non-refoulement and extra-territorial jurisdiction: State sovereignty
and migration controls at sea in the European context. Leiden journal of
international law, 30(1), 49-70.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-internationallaw/article/nonrefoulement-and-extra-territorial-jurisdiction-statesovereignty-and-migration-controls-at-sea-in-the-europeancontext/DEB19084E3229F6950496F3F8044CAC6
Klein, N. (2011). Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea. Oxford University Press.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ODla01-tisC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=Klein,+N.+(2011).+Maritime+Security+and+th
e+Law+of+the+Sea.+Oxford+University+Press&ots=rfuUAfyoh&sig=rDf1J6B90r8nt3a_kZImtd2jvqI
Klein, N. (2014). Assessing Australia's push back the boats policy under
international law: Legality and accountability for maritime interceptions of

59

irregular migrants. Melb. J. Int'l L., 15, 414. https://heinonline.org/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/meljil15&Chapter=17
Klein, N. (2017). A Maritime Security Framework for the Legal Dimensions of
Irregular Migration by Sea. In 'Boat Refugees' and Migrants at Sea.
https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004300750/B9789004300750s004.xml
Lahlou, M. (2015). Morocco's experience of migration as a sending, transit and
receiving country. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09850.10.pdf
Lamichhane, S. (2017). The Extra-Territorial Applicability of the Principle of nonrefoulement and Its Interception with Human Rights Law.
https://heinonline.org/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/kslr5&Chapter=34
Mallia, P. (2009). Migrant smuggling by sea.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B_N5DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd
&pg=PR11&dq=2.+Mallia,+P.+(2009).+Migrant+smuggling+by+sea&ots=U
9kVUVwu3C&sig=y0T6Zw54o-v5Yp8SeUHGCNPKD9U
Markard, N. (2016). The right to leave by sea: legal limits on EU migration control
by third countries. European Journal of International Law, 27(3), 591-616.
https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/27/3/591/2197244
Marmo, M., & Giannacopoulos, M. (2017). Cycles of judicial and executive power
in irregular migration.
https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s4087
8-017-0059-x
McDonald, M. (2015). Australian foreign policy under the Abbott government.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2015.1056514
Medvedyev and others v. France, 3394/03 (2010).
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ca
d=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiB86Sh0IDxAhWs_CoKHc2mALMQFjAAe
gQIBBAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fhudoc.echr.coe.int%2Fapp%2Fconversion
%2Fpdf%2F%3Flibrary%3DECHR%26id%3D00197979&usg=AOvVaw11ZsThkTzVyPrXSPCA_Bws
Migreurop. (2020). Hundreds of NGOs and individuals call for revocation of Libya’s
SAR Zone. http://migreurop.org/article2997.html
Missbach, A. (2015). Troubled transit: Asylum seekers stuck in Indonesia. ISEASYusof Ishak Institute. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=se-

60

gCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Antje+Missbach,+Troubled+Transit:+
Asylum+Seekers+Stuck+in+Indonesia+(2015),+at+67.&ots=WxJVgoYTdD&sig=jOXZ6RpuC_SKpasgorUAOkcG5vE
Moreno-Lax, V. (2017). The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)
practice in Europe and Australia. Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for
International Refugee Law. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/5a0574597.pdf
Moreno-Lax, V., Ghezelbash, D., & Klein, N. (2019). Between life, security and
rights: Framing the interdiction of ‘boat migrants’ in the Central
Mediterranean and Australia. Leiden Journal of International Law.
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/58992/MorenoLax%20Between%20Life,%20Security%20and%20Rights:%20Framing%20t
he%20Interdiction%20of%20‘Boat%20Migrants’%20in%20the%20Central%
20Mediterranean%20and%20Australia%202019%20Accepted.pdf?sequence
=4
Moreno-Lax, V. (2020). The Architecture of Functional Jurisdiction: Unpacking
Contactless Control—On Public Powers, SS and Others v. Italy, and the
“Operational Model”. German Law Journal, 21(3), 385-416.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-lawjournal/article/architecture-of-functional-jurisdiction-unpacking-contactlesscontrolon-public-powers-ss-and-others-v-italy-and-the-operationalmodel/AA2DADF2F1DCDD19E8F9E6E316D7C110
M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment,
ITLOS Reports (1999). https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-ofcases/case-no-2/
N.D and N.T v. Spain, 8697/15 (2020).
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/nd-and-nt-v-spain-grandchamber-rule-return-migrants-morocco-did-not-breach-convention
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2021). Search
and rescue and the protection of migrants in the central Mediterranean Sea.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ve
d=2ahUKEwjZ9PrYuvHwAhXTK3cKHYE_D5MQFjAAegQIBBAD&url=h
ttps%3A%2F%2Freliefweb.int%2Freport%2Flibya%2Flethal-disregardsearch-and-rescue-and-protection-migrants-central-mediterraneansea&usg=AOvVaw2OesKLXe2EQ4wFPkQmZtkX
Palm, A. (2017). The Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding: The baseline of a
policy approach aimed at closing all doors to Europe? EU Immigration and
Asylum Law and Policy, 2.
https://www.academia.edu/download/55935251/The_Italy-

61

Libya_Memorandum_of_Understanding__The_baseline_of_a_policy_approa
ch_aimed_at_closing_all_doors_to_Europe__-_EU_Immigration_an.pdf
Papanicolopulu, I. (2013). Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.2.0417?casa_token=u
9Vlmk5ePDsAAAAA:AjIbiF41a9vTkwvGFygBcXM3L1XlWkyf16IYJwZtxcwWKQg2nXNMKzwJ7M29_nbsrRLP
ThDPJfa64vTF1KP-dNmiB0UWhZ8I6xMhFR4quYLIq0SeDvq
Papastavridis, E. (2013). The interception of vessels on the high seas.
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzYwNzE5Nl
9fQU41?sid=4c7b8bfc-6436-4ca5-a4d36d93a953fd80@sessionmgr102&vid=1&format=EB&rid=1
Papastavridis, E. (2020). The European Convention of Human Rights and Migration
at Sea: Reading the “Jurisdictional Threshold” of the Convention Under the
Law of the Sea Paradigm. German Law Journal, 21(3), 417-435.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-lawjournal/article/european-convention-of-human-rights-and-migration-at-seareading-the-jurisdictional-threshold-of-the-convention-under-the-law-of-thesea-paradigm/4EAFB6C224386882CD80C441F708E9B8
Parliament of Australia. (2017). Boat arrivals and boat turnbacks in Australia since
1976.
https://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parlia
mentary_library/pubs/rp/rp1617/quick_guides/boatturnbacks
Pijnenburg, A. (2018). From Italian pushbacks to Libyan pullbacks: Is Hirsi 2.0 in
the making in Strasbourg?. European Journal of Migration and Law, 20(4),
396-426. https://brill.com/view/journals/emil/20/4/article-p396_3.xml
Pijnenburg, A. (2020). Containment instead of Refoulement: Shifting state
responsibility in the age of cooperative migration control?. Human Rights
Law Review, 20(2), 306-332. https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/articleabstract/20/2/306/5850666
Poulantzas, N. M. (2002). The right of hot pursuit in international law. Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=npdgzJEROswC&oi=fnd&p
g=PR7&dq=Poulantzas,+N.+M.+(2002).+The+right+of+hot+pursuit+in+inte
rnational+law.&ots=9NFHUQXQ9A&sig=qDCbhdXMEEOnKQuL9b33TD
FpNbA
Ratcovich, M. (2019). International Law and the Rescue of Refugees at
Sea (Doctoral dissertation, Department of Law, Stockholm University).

62

https://www.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1323140&dswid=4613
Refugee Council of Australia. (2021). Offshore processing statistics.
https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/operation-sovereign-borders-offshoredetention-statistics/2/
Roam, C. (2017). The Uncertain Future of Australia's Pacific Solution.
https://heinonline.org/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/sdintl19&Chapter=17
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S 155. (1993).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/155/
Scotto, A. (2017). From emigration to asylum destination, Italy Navigates shifting
migration tides. Migration Policy Institute.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/emigration-asylum-destination-italynavigates-shifting-migration-tides
Shearer, I. (1998). The Development of International Law with Respect to the Law
Enforcement Roles of Navies and Coast Guards in Peacetime. International
Law Studies, 71(1), 7. https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=ils
S.S and others v. Italy, 21660/18. (2019). https://www.icj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/ECtHR-SS_v_Italy_final-JointTPIICJECREAIREDCR-English-2019.pdf
Tanaka, Y. (2019). The international law of the sea.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Zli3BwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PR15&dq=tanaka+international+law+third+edition&ots=PMrM9j2bk8&
sig=XYUb2z7R4FPtftusKDdQVTauyv4
The Haitian Center for Human Rights et al. V. United States, 10.675 (1997).
https://www.refworld.org/cases,IACHR,3ae6b71b8.html
The Times. (2018). Libya takes charge of refugee rescues in the Med.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/libya-takes-charge-of-refugee-rescues-inthe-med-zgrjl9dsd
Tsaltas, G., & Rodotheatos, G. M. (2010). Maritime Interdiction Operations: A View
Through International Law Lens. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/DrMakisRodotheatos/publication/208845949_Maritime_Interdiction_Operations_A_
View_Through_International_Law_Lens/links/08521bd5be2ca794c401fbe7/

63

Maritime-Interdiction-Operations-A-View-Through-International-LawLens.pdf
UNHCR. (2003). Conclusion on protection safeguards in interception measures
No.97. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f93b2894.html
UNHCR. (2007). Advisory opinion on the extra-territorial application of nonrefoulement obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html
UNHCR. (2014). UNHCR submissions in the High Court of Australia in the case of
CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Common
wealth of Australia.
https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNHCR,,AUS,54169e8e4,0.html
UNHCR. (2015). UNHCR legal position: Despite court ruling on Sri Lankans
detained at sea, Australia bound by international obligations.
https://www.refworld.org/docid/54d1e5014.html
UNHCR. (2018). Country of embarkation and demographic of arrivals.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67555.pdf
UNHCR. (2019). The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/1951refugee-convention.html
UNHCR. (2020). Italy sea arrival dashboard 2020.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020_12_Sea_Arrivals
_Dashboard_December.pdf
UNHCR. (2021). Operational data portal, Mediterranean situation. Retrieved May
29, 2021 from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean
UNSMIL. (2015). The situation of migrants in transit through Libya en route to
Europe. https://unsmil.unmissions.org/situation-migrants-transit-throughlibya-en-route-europe-breifing-note-08-may-2015
Vari, E. (2020). Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding Italy's International
Obligations. Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 43, 105.
https://heinonline.org/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/hasint43&Chapter=7
VCCL v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, FCA1297. (2001).
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ca
d=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjlyL-

64

fxIrxAhWwl4sKHQ2uCfgQFjAAegQIBRAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.r
efworld.org%2Fpdfid%2F3bab3c574.pdf&usg=AOvVaw36cV2U4ewip0KE
0DMRw4HW
V872/00A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, FCAFC 185.
(2002). https://www.refworld.org/cases,AUS_FC,403b175f4.html
Women on waves and others v. Portugal, 31276/05. (2009).
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ve
d=2ahUKEwjfnK_wlf7wAhVQnIsKHctpAkUQFjADegQIAxAD&url=https
%3A%2F%2Fhudoc.echr.coe.int%2Fapp%2Fconversion%2Fdocx%2Fpdf%3
Flibrary%3DECHR%26id%3D003-26197922854756%26filename%3DAnnounce%2520judgments%25200305.02.09.pdf%26logEvent%3DFalse&usg=AOvVaw3DzSovkEC_9Xt59jSX
S24K

65

